T.P. GOPALAKRISHNAN versus STATE OF KERALA
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A B C D E F G H 478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 14 S.C.R. [2022] 14 S.C.R. 478 478 T.P. GOPALAKRISHNAN v. STATE OF KERALA (Criminal Appeal Nos.187-188 of 2017) DECEMBER 08, 2022 [B. R. GAVAI AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.] Constitution of India: Art.20(2) β Protection against double jeopardy β Code of Criminal Procedure β s.300 β βSame offenceβ meaning of β Appellant-accused worked as Agricultural officer for the period 31.05.1991 to 31.05.1994 β Accusations against him was that he committed criminal breach of trust and misappropriated certain amount in his official position as a public servant, by not remitting the same to the sub-treasury β Accusations related to time period from 27.04.1992 to 25.08.1992 and 01.03.1993 to 12.04.1994 β Trial Court convicted the appellant for offences u/ ss.13(2) r/w 13(1)(c) of the PC Act and s.409 IPC β High Court upheld the conviction β Appellant contended inter alia that present cases are barred u/s.300 CrPC as he was already prosecuted in previous three cases pertaining to the same allegations wherein he was convicted in two cases and acquitted in one case β On appeal, held: There are three conditions for application of Art. 20(2) β Firstly, previous proceedings before a court of law or a judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction in which the person must have been prosecuted, the prosecution must be valid and not null or abortive β Secondly, conviction or acquittal in the previous proceedings must be in force at the time of the second proceedings in relation to the same offence and same set of facts, for which he was prosecuted and punished in the first proceedings β Thirdly, the subsequent proceeding must be a fresh proceeding, where he is for the second time, sought to be prosecuted and punished for the same offence and same set of facts β βSame offenceβ means where the offences are not distinct and the ingredients of the offences are identical β Embargo of double jeopardy u/Art.20 does not apply where there are two distinct offences made up of different ingredients though offences may have some overlapping features β The charges in the present case are for relevant period from 27.04.1992 to A B C D E F G H 479 25.08.1992 and 01.03.1993 to 12.04.1994 which time period is same as in the previous three cases, that is 28.02.1994 to 02.04.1994, 15.12.1992 to 31.03.1993 and 05.03.1994 to 08.03.1994 β Present cases pertain to same set of facts and are in respect of same period of misappropriation β The matter in the previous three cases and the present cases relate to same offences which are committed in the course of same transaction while holding the one and same post of Agriculture officer by the appellant β Charges in the previous three cases were framed after the audit and the prosecution would have been well aware of the misappropriation in respect of present cases β Since, appellant has already been prosecuted in the year 1999 in respect of previous three cases, the trial court as well as High Court was not right in convicting and sentencing the accused β Embargo of double jeopardy u/s. 300 applied to the facts of the case β Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 β Penal Code, 1860. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.300(2) β Subsequent prosecution for any distinct offence β Failure to take prior consent of State Government β Effect thereof β Held: When the charge of the second trial is for distinct offence, the trial is not barred β A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be tried for a distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been framed with the prior consent of the State Government β In the instant case, even if the allegations are different from those in the previous cases, the prosecution having failed to obtain the prior consent of the State Government, the trial is unlawful. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Double jeopardy and double punishment β Difference between β Double punishment may arise when a person is convicted for two or more offences charged in one indictment β However, the question of double jeopardy arises only when a second trial is sought on subsequent indictment fowling a conviction or acquittal on an earlier indictment β Doctrine of double jeopardy is not a protection to the individual from peril of second sentence or punishment, nor to the service of sentence for one offence β It is a protection against double jeopardy for the same offence that is, against a second trial for the same offence Constitution of India β Art. 21 β Ri
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