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T. CAJEE versus U. JORMANIK SIEM AKD ANOTHER.

Citation: [1961] 1 S.C.R. 750 · Decided: 20-09-1960 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

1960 
Sepl1mbet- zo. 
750 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1961] 
T. CAJEE 
v. 
U. JORMAKIK SIEM AKD ANOTHER. 
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., J. L. KAPUR, P. B. GAJENDRA-
OADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO e.nd K. N. W ANCHoo, JJ.) 
Assam Tribal Areas, administration of-Rmwval of tribal 
Chief-Whether permissi/fte by administrative action without making 
of l«UJ-District Council-Executive Committee, powers of-Interim 
suspension of Chief-Constitution of India, Sixth Schedule. 
The respondent was Siem of Mylliem siemship in United 
Khasi and Jamtia Hills District in the Tribal Areas of Assam, 
having been elected as such by the Myntri electors according to 
custom in l95r. In June, 1952, a District Council was constitu-
ted for the District under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution 
and the siemship was brought under it. The rules in the Sixth 
Schedule empowered the District Council to make laws with 
respect to various matters regarding the administration of the 
District including the appointment or succession of Chiefs and 
Headmen. 
No law was made regulating the appointment and 
succession of Chiefs and Headmen. The Chief Executive Mem-
ber of the Executive Committee of the District Council served 
on the respondent a notice to show cause why he should not he 
removed from his office and suspended him. The respondent 
challenged the action on the grounds: (i) that he could not be 
removed by administrative orders but only by making a law, 
(ii) that the Executive Committee could not take any action in 
this case, and (iii) that the order of suspension was ultra virt.;. 
Held, that the District Council had the power to appoint or 
remove administrative personnel under the general power of 
administration vested in it by the Sixth Schedule. The District 
Council was both an administrativeas well as a legislative body. 
After a law was mad~ with respect to the appointment or 
removal of administrative personnel the authority would be 
bound to follow it; but until then it could exercise its admini-
strative Powers. Since the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autono· 
mous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Head 
men) Act, 1959, had now come into force further action shouk 
be taken in accordance with that Act. 
The Executive Committee could, under r. 3o(a) of the Assam 
Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 
1951, act on behalf of the District Cou.ncil in cases o.f emergency 
and it was not for the courts to go mto the question whether 
there was an emergency or not. ln these circumstances the 
action taken by the Executive Committee could not be 
challenged. 
An order of interim suspension could be passed against the 
l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
751 
respondent while inquiry was pending into his conduct even 
z960 
though there was no specific provision to that effect in his terms 
of appointment. But he was entitled to his remuneration for 
T. Cajee 
the period of bis interim suspension as there was no statute or 
v. . 
. 
rule existing under which it could be withheld. 
U. fo•manik s .. m 
The Management of Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers: Union, 
& Another 
[r960] r S.C.R. 476, applied. 
Per Sobba Rao, J.-It is very doubtful whether; when the 
Constitution confers on an authority power to make Jaws· in res-
pect of a specific subject matter, that authority can deal with 
the same subject matter withont making such a Jaw in its admi-
nistrative capacity. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: 
Civil 
Appeal 
No. 394 of 1960. 
Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 19, 
1960, of the Assam High Court in Civil Rule No. 
69/1959. 
O. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, A. V. 
Viswanatha Sastri, Narendra Kumar Lahiri and 
R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant. 
N. 0. Chatterjee and D. N. Mukherjee, for res-
pondent No. 1. 
Naunit Lal, for respondent No. 2. 
1960. September 20. The Judgment of Sinha, C. J., 
Kapur, Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo, JJ., was deli-
vered by Wanchoo, J. Subba Rao, J., delivered a 
separate Judgment. 
WANCHOO J.-This appeal, on a certi5cate .granted 
Wanchoo J. 
under Art. 132 (I) of the Constitution by the Assam 
High Court, raises questioqs regarding the interpreta-
tion of certain provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the 
Constitution. A writ petition was filed by U. Jormanik 
Siem (hereinafter called the respondent) in the Assam 
High Court against the Chief· Executive .Member of 
the District Council (hereinafter called .the appellant). 
United Khasi and J aintia Hills Distric

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