SYED QASIM RAZVI versus THE STATE OF HYDERABAD AND OTHERS

Citation: [1953] 1 S.C.R. 589 · Decided: 19-01-1953 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. PATANJALI SASTRI · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

' • 
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
, 
589 
SYED QASIM RAZVI 
v. 
THE STATE OF HYDERABAD AND OTHERS 
(and other cases) 
[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MuKHERJEA, CHANDRA-
SEKHARA AIYAR, VIVIAN BOSE and GHULAM 
HASAN JJ.] 
Constitution of India, 1950, arts. 13, 14, 21-Special Tribunal 
Regulation (V of 1358-F, Hyderabad)-Trial under Regulation 
commenced before 26th January, 1950-Trial continued after that 
date-Validity of conviction-Regulation, whether discriminatory 
and void-Question whether discriminatory provisions were applied 
in fact after 26th January, whether relevant. 
The Military Governor of the Hyderabad State promulgated 
on October 30, 1948, a Regulation called the Special Tribunal 
Regulation, V of 1358 Fasli, under which a Special Tribunal was 
constituted consisting of three members appointed by the Military 
Governor. 
The Regulation provided that the Military Governor 
may, by general or special order, direct that any offence or class 
of offences should be tried by such Tribunal, and the procedure for 
trial laid down in the Regulation differed from the provisions of 
the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code in the following mate-
rial particulars among others, viz., the Tribunal had power to 
take cognisance of offences without committal, there was no pro-
vision for trial with jury or assessors, the language of the Tribu-
nal was to be English, only a memorandum of the evidence need 
be taken, there was no provision for de novo trial on change of 
personnel, and there was no provision for transfer, revision or 
confirmation of sentences. The cases against the petitioners, who 
were charged with rioting, dacoity, arson and other offences, wern• 
directed to be tried by the Special Tribunal on' October 6, 1949. 
The accused were convicted in September, 1950, and the convic-
tion on some of the charges was upheld by the High Court on 
appeal in April, 1951. 
The accused appealed to the Supreme 
Court and also applied under art. 32 of the Constitution of India 
for quashing the orders of the High Court and the Special Tribu-
nal on the ground that the Special Tribunal Regulation became 
void on the 26th January, 1950, as its provisions contravened 
articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution which came into force on 
that date, and the continuation of the trial and conviction of the 
petitioners after that date was illegal: 
Held, per PATANJALISASTRI C.J., MUKHERJEA and CHANDRA-
SEKHARA AIYAR JJ. (BOSE and GHULAM HASAN JJ. dissenting). (i) 
Article 13 of the Constitution had no retrospective effect and, even 
77 
1963 
Jan. 19. 
Syed Q,;,si1n 
R11zvi 
v. 
The State of 
Hyderabad 
and OthtJrs. 
590 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1953] 
though some of the provisions of the impugned Regulation con-
travened art. 14, the Regulation must he held to be valid for all 
past transactions and for enforcing rights and liabilities accrued 
before the advent of the Constitution, and on this principle the 
order made by the Military Governor referring the cases to the 
Sp~cial Tribunal cannot be impeached, and the Special Tribunal 
must be deemed to have taken cognisance of the cases properly 
and its proceedings up to the date of the coming in of the Con-
stitution must be regarded as valid. 
(ii) In a case like this where part of the trial could not be 
challenged as bad, it is incumbent on the court to consider, first, 
¥vhether the discriminatory provisions of law could be separated 
from the rest and even without them a fair measure of equality 
in the matter of procedure could be secured to the accused and 
secondly, whether the procedure actually followed did or did not 
proceed upon the discriminatory provisions. A mere threat or 
possibility of unequal treatment is not sufficient to invalidate the 
subsequent proceedings. 
(iii) On the facts the accused had substantially the benefit of 
a normal trial, though there wer6 deviations in ce:rtain particulars 
and the conviction of the petitioners could not be set aside merely 
because the Constitution of India came into force before the· 
completion of their trial. 
BOSE J.-(i) Under Art. 13 (1) of the Constitution atrial can-
not be legally continued after the Constitution on the basis of a law 
which offends the fundamental provisions of the Constitution and 
therefore wbich1 though good when made, would have been bad if 
it had been passed after the Constitution, because the most vital 
part of a trial is its conclusion and therefore a conviction after 
the Constitution bas

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