SYED IBRAHIM versus STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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- SYED IBRAHIM A v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH JULY 27, 2006 [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.] B Penal Code. 1860-Seclion 302-Murder-Solitary wilness-Appellant convicted by Cour/s below for murdering his wife-Conviction based upon the sole testimony of PW I, the deceased's father-Conviction challenged-Held: C Evidence on record disproves veracity of PWJ s evidence to a large extent- Place of occurrence itself not being established, prosecution version cannot be accepted-High Court erred in lightly brushing aside the apparent inconsistencies/ discrepancies in evidence by observing Iha/ PW I was illiterale-Appellant accordingly acquitted. Ma-rims-Principle of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus"-Explained. Evidence-Discrepancies in-Normal discrepancies and material discrepancies-Distinguished D Evidence Act, 1872-Seclion 134-Number of wilnesses-Nol re/evanl E for proof of any fact, material evidence-Prosecution lo succeed even if !here is a solitary cogent and credible wilness. Appellant allegedly stabbed his wife with a knife causing multiple injuries resulting in her death. Trial Court found the appellant guilty under Section 302, IPC based on the testimony of PWt, the father of the F deceased and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. PWl is the solitary witness who claimed to have seen the occurrence. High Court upheld the conviction. Hence the present appeal. In appeal before this Court it was contended that the High Court G its:M having noticed that the evidence of PWl was not fully credible, erred in holding that the same was sufficient to hold the appellant guilty. Allowing the appeal, the Court 105 H 106 Sl!PREME COURT REPORTS [2006] Sl'.PP. 4 S.C.R. A HELD: I.I. Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non- acceptance of evidence tenden!d by PWI to a large extent to contend about desirability to throw out entire prosecution case. In essence prayer is to apply the principle of "fals11s in 11no fi1/sus in omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. 1111-CI B 1.2. Even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be C deficient, or to be not wholly credible. Falsity of material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim ''jidsus in uno fa/sus in omnibus" has no application in India and the witness or witnesses cannot be branded as liar(s). It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of D evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called a mandatory rule of evidence. [ 111-D-FI 1.3. An attempt has to be made in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate grain irom the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is nut frasible to separate truth from falsehood, because grain and chaff are E inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new case !Jas to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made is to discard the evidence in toto. (112-B-CI f 1.4. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies do so. Normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are always there G however honest and truthful a witness may be. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy may be categorized. [112-D-E[ Nisar Alli v. The State of Uuar Pradesh, AIR (1957) SC 366; Gurcharan H Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab. AIR (1956) SC 460: Sohrab s/o Be/i Nayata SYED IBRAHIM v. ST ATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH I 07 andAnr. v. TheStateofMadhyaPradesh, 1J97213SCC751; UgarAhirand A Ors. v. The State of Bihar, AI
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