SWAMI SHIVSHANKARGIRI CHELLA SWAMI & ANR. versus SATYA GYAN NIKETAN& ANR.
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[2017] 2 S.C.R. 365 SWAMI SHIVSHANKARGIRI CHELLA SWAMI & ANR. A v. SATYA GYAN NIKETAI\ & ANR. (Civil Appeal No. 3166of2017) FEBRUARY23,2017 [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, :fJ.) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s. 92 - Public charities - Permission to grant leave uls. 92 to interested persons to initiate a suit - On facts, property transferred-waqfed to respondent no. 2 by a deed - Appellant interested in achieving the purpose for which the property was transferred - Application by appellant uls. 92 to obtain permission to institute a suit, allowed - However, the High Court set aside the order - On appeal, held: Property was waqfedl gifted for a 1Gl1:fiil purpose-a 'trust' - Thus, the application filed by appellants was within the required ambit of s. 92 and the District Judge rightly permitted the appellants to institute a suit - High Court erred in setting aside the well reasoned order and in not diligently examining the facts and circumstances in the light of the registered deed - Furthermore, it was the statutory duty of the Court to examine that whether the plaint is so annexed with the application uls. 92 which is pre-requisite for filing the application for leave to file a suit - High Court also erred in neglecting this fact - A/legations put forth could only be determined by way of evidence in a special suit uls. 92 and respondent No.2 is enjoying the ownership of the immovable property while acting as a trustee - Thus, for the ends of justice, appellants granted liberty to move appropriate application. Disposing of the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 A bare perusal of the Section 92 CPC would show that a suit can be instituted in respect of a public trust by the advocate general or two or more persons having an interest in the trust after obtaining leave of the Court in the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction. An analysis of these provisions would show that it was conยทsidered desirable to prevent a public trust from being harassed or put to legal expenses by reckless or 365 B c D E F G H 366 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R. frivolous suits being brought against the trustees and hence, a provision was made for leave of the Con rt having to be obtained before the snit is instituted. [Para 12] [371-C-D] 1.2 On considering the trust deed executed in the favour of respondent No.2-Prachaarini Sabha, it is noticed that the purpose of transferring ownership of the property was subject to certain conditions and purposes which cast duties on respondent No.2, including development of the Hindi Language and opening a library. Hence, the purpose is rendering the nature of Sabha to be a trust. It can be inferred from the perusal of the application made that plea was sought to seek permission only to institute a suit alleging the Sabha to be acting as a trust. [Paras 13, 14) [371- E-G] 1.3 It appears that the property was waq fed/gifted for a lawful purpose i.e. a 'trust' is an obligation annexed to the ownership of the property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another owner, (Act II of 1882 Trusts, Section 3]. Accordingly, the application filed by the, appellants was falling within the required ambit of Section 92 CPC and the District Judge rightly permitted the appellants to institute a suit. The High Court erred in setting aside the well reasoned order of the Judge and grossly erred in not diligently examining the facts and circumstances in the light of the registered deed. [Para 18] [377-D-F] 1.4 The plaint was not annexed with the application filed under Section 92 CPC which is pre-requisite for filing the application for leave to file a suit. Based on the averments in the plaint only, it can be inferred that whether an application under Section 92 is maintainable or not. [Para 19] (377-G-H] 1.5 After the amendment was brought to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1976, duty was cast upon the Court, instead of Advocate General, to take into account these considerations for granting leave under this section. Prior to the 1976 amendment, all these considerations were to be kept in mind by the Advocate General before granting consent to institute a suit against a public trust. It was the statutory duty of the Court to examine that SWAMI SHIVSHANKARGIRI CHELLA SWAMI & ANR. v. SATYA GYAN NIKETAN w
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