LexSUSHILA DEVI versus RAMANANDAN PRASAD & ORS.
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845 SUSHILA DEVI v. RAMANANDAN PRASAD & ORS. November 26, 1975 [V. R. KRISHNA TYER AND A. c. GUPTA, JJ.J Kosi Area (Restoration of Lands to Raiyat~) Act, 19'51, ss. 3, 7, 13 a11d 16- 0rder pasS<d for reswration on pC:0'1nent of lst instalment df compe11sa1io11- Applica111 que.1tioning correctness of order and filing application more than 5 years later for extension of time for payment in lump.mm-Mai11tai11ability- Fi11al order, what is-Co'urt' s actio11 11ot to prejudice pc:wties-Scope of princi- ple-Limitation Act, 1963, s. 5, applicability. Section 3 of the Kasi Area (Restoration of Lands to Raiyats) Act. 1951, ·provides for the restoration to former raiyats by the Collector, on his own motion or otherwise, of land~ which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of' rent or which were treated a> abandoned bet- ween January l, 1939 and December 31, 1950, due to floods in the Kasi river. Under s. 7. the Collector is to determine. after inquiring into any objections, the fond 1 iable to be restored to the raiyat, the amount payable by him for the restoration being the cost of improvement, if any, to whom that amount is pay- able, whether it should be paid in instalments, and the amount of each instal- ment The instalments shall. however, be payable within a period not exceed- ing 5 year<;. .Section 13 states that, subject to appeal, orders passed by the Collector are final, and s. 16 provides that the decision on appeal shall be final. The respondent applied for restoration of land which was sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent. On February 17, 1958, an order for restoration was made in rnspect of a part of the area and compensation was directed to be paid to the appellant in three instalments: The order added that if' the first instalment was not paid within the specified period, "the applicant would Jose ~he benefit of the order of restoration". The respondent did not pay the first instalment within the time prescribed for its payment, but appealed to the Appellate Authority. The appeal was dismissed and the respondent filed a revision before the Commissioner (though the Act did not provide for a revi-· ·•ion against the order of the Appellate Authority). and the Commis'lioner allow- ed the revision. The appellant filed a writ petition and the High Court Quashed the Commissioner's order. A further appeal to the Supreme Court by the res- pondent was dismissed for non-prosecution. Thereafter, on October 15, 1965, the respondent applied for an order extending the time for payment fixed by ·the order of February 17. 1958, and for permission to deposit the entire amount then determined in one lurnpsum. The respondent was allowed to do so. The appellant's appeal was allowed by the. Appellate Authority. But, the High Court allowed the respondent's writ petition on the grounds. (I) that the first order of f'ehnrnrv 17. 1958 was not a final order and, therefore, time could be ex- tended notwithstanding the expiry of the period fixed by the 1958 order for ·payment of the first instalment; (2) that the Court's action should not preju- dice any party and, therefore, excluding the time taken for the various remedies ·pursued bv the .respondent, the application made on October 15, 1965 was within the period of 5 yiears from the original order; and ( 3) in any case, the delay could be and must be deemed to have been, condoned under s. 5, Limitation Act. 1963. • Allowing the appeal to this Court, HELD : (l) The order of February 17. 1958, made it clear !hat on failure to pav the first instalment within the specified period, the benefit of the order would be lost. This is no doubt a conditional order; it is not, however, an Jntcrlocutory order, but is a final order. [850G] A B c D E F G H A B c D 846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1976] 2 S.C.R. (2) The principle that the "Court's action should not prejudice any party"· has no relevance in the context of the present ca,e. The remedies pur,ucd bY" the respondent wen: steps taken by him at his own risk and he cannot, a~ a matter of right. ask for excluding the time spent on those proceedings. [850H-85 IA] (3) (a) Section 5, Limitation Act cannot be invoked in connection with the application of October 15, 1965, because, (i) the officer to whom the applica- tion was made was not a Court; and (ii) there is no time limit prescribed for the ooplbtion which could be extended u
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