SURYAKUMAR GOVINDJEE versus KRISHNAMMAL AND ORS.

Citation: [1990] 2 S.C.R. 782 · Decided: 26-04-1990 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S. RANGANATHAN · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
SURY AKUMAR GOVINDJEE 
v. 
KRISHNAMMAL AJliD ORS. 
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APRIL 26, 1990 
B 
[S. RANGANATHAN AND A.M. AHMADI, JJ.] 
Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act-Section 
2 (2 )-'Building' -What is 'kaichalai'-Whether included. 
y 
On 9.6.1936 the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents execu-
c ted a lease deed in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant, 
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for a period of 15 years. The property leased out was vacant land, well 
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and Kaichalai, and the lessee was permitted to construct on the vacant 
land and instal petrol selling business. It was further stipulated that 
after the expiry of the lease period the Jessee shall at his own expense 
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remove the structure put up by hint and deliver possession of the vacant 
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land together with well and Kaichalai. The lease was extended from 
time to time. 
The lessor had itled petitions in 1962 and 1979 to evict the lessee 
under the Madras Buildings (lease and Rent Control) Act, 1950 but 
without success. Thereafter, in 1979 the present respondents instituted 
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a petition for eviction of the lessee on the ground of demolition and 
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reconstruction, and of wilful denial of title, within the meaning of Sec-
tions 14(1)(b) and 10(2)(vii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and 
Rent Control) Act. 
In the meantinte, the provisions of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' 
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Protection Act, 1922 were extended to the municipal limits of 
Udomalpettai. Taking advantage of this, the lessee itled petition claint-
ing the benefit of compulsory purchase conferred on tenants of land 
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under the said Act. The District Munsif-cum-Rent Controller allowed 
the lessor's petition for eviction and dismissed the lessee's petition for 
compulsory purchase. The Sub-Judge dismissed the appeals. 
G 
The lessee itled two revision petitions before the High Court which 
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declined to interfere. 
Before this Court it was contened on behalf of the appellant that 
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the original lease comprised only of the vacant site, well and Kaichalai; 
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the kaichalai was merely in the nature of a shed pnt up for the tethering 
782 
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SURYAKUMAR v. KRISHNAMMAL 
783 
of cattle and it was not a 'building' within the meaning of Section 2(2) of 
the Rent Control Act; though the small Kaichalai was situated in a 
corner of the site, the lease intended by the parties was only that of the 
site. It was further contended that where a lease was a composite one of 
land and buildings, the court had to address itself to the primary or 
dominant intention of the parties; if the intention was to lease a 
building-the lease of land being adjunct or incidental, the Rent Cun-
trol Act would apply; on the other hand, if the dominant intention was 
to lease a site-the presence of a building thereon not being considered 
material by either party-the lease would not be one of a 'building' 
covered by the Rent Control Act. 
Larsen & Toubro case [1988] 4 SCC 260, relied upon. 
On behalf of the respondents it was contended that, in the case of 
a composite lease, the existence of a building or hut on the land 
(howsoever small, insignificant or useless it may be) was sufficient per 
se to bring the lease within the scope of the Rent Control Act. 
Irani v. Chidambaram Chettiar, AIR 1953 Madras 650 and Salay 
Mohd. Saitv. J.M.S. Charity, [1969] 1MLJ--SC16, relied upon. 
Dismissing the appeals, this Court, 
HELD: (1) The Tamil_ word "kaichalai"' seems to denote a 
structure or a roof put up by hand. Whatever may be the precise 
meaning of the term, the definition in Section 2(2) of the Rent Act 
clearly includes the 'kaicha/ai' in the present case. [789D] 
(2) Since the Rent Act applies to residential and non-residential 
buildings alike, the expression 'hut' cannot be restricted only to huts or 
cottages intended to be lived in. It will also take in any shed, hut or 
other crude or third class construction consisting of an enclosure made 
of mid or by poles supporting a tin or asbestos roof that can be put to 
use for any purpose, residential or non-residential, in the same manner 
as any other fU"st class construction. [789E-F) 
(3) In the case of composite lease of land and building, a question 
may well arise whether the lease is one of land although there is a small 
building or hut (whkh does not really fignre in the transaction) or of a 
lease of the building (in which the lease of land is incidental) or a lease of 
both regardless of their respective dimensions. [790G] 
A 

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