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SURINDERJIT SINGH MAND & ANR. versus STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.

Citation: [2016] 5 S.C.R. 653 · Decided: 05-07-2016 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.S. KHEHAR · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

[2016] 5 S.C.R. 653 
SURINDERJIT SINGH MAND & ANR. 
v. 
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 
(Criminal Appeal No. 565 of2016) 
JULY 05, 2016 
(JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR AND C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.] 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: 
s. I 97 - Sanction before prosecution - Arrest of one person 
by police officials on 28. 6.1999 - Complaint by 111other of the 
arrestee alleging illegal and unauthorised detention of her son fro111 
24.6.1999 to 28.6.1999 - Prosecution against six police officials 
aper obtaining wnction uls. 197 - Application of the complainant 
uls. 319 for taking cognizance against the appellants-police 
officials - Charges framed against appellants - Assailed in 
Revision on the ground that appellants could not have been 
prosecuted in absence of sanction for prosecution - Revision 
dismissed by High Court - On appeal, held: For applying s.197, 
it has to be ascertained as to whether the alleged offence had been 
committed "while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of 
his official duty" - Jn the present case, the period of apprehension 
from 28. 6.1999 (when arrest was admitted) can be considered to 
have been made "while acting or purporting to act in the discharge 
of their official duty", but not the period fro111 24. 6.1999 to 
28.6.1999 - Therefore, sanction for prosecution in respect of the 
appellants-accused was not required. 
ss. 197, 319 - Scope of s.197 - Whether the mandate of s.197 
would extend to cases where cognizance taken under s.319 Cr.P.C. 
- Held: Mandate of sanction uls.197 is a mandatory pre-requisite, 
before a court of competent jurisdiction takes cognizance, even 
when cognizance is taken u/s. 319 Cr.P.C. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. The alleged action constituting the allegations 
levelled against the appellants, is based on the arrest and 
detention of 'N' from 24.06.1999 upto 28.06.1999 (before, he 
653 
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654 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016) 5 S.C.R. 
was admitted to have been formally arrested on 28.06.1999). 
Insofar as the power of arrest and detention by police officials/ 
officers is concerned, reference may be made to Sections 36, 
49, 50 and 50A of Cr.P.C. In view of s. 36 Cr.P.C, there cannot 
be any serious doubt about the fact, that the appellants were 
holding the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, at the 
relevant time (from 24.06.199 to 28.06.1999). Both the 
appellants were " ... officers superior in rank to an officer in 
charge of a police station ... ". Both the appellants were therefore 
possessed with the authority to detain and arrest, 'N' at the 
relevant time (from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999). The question 
for complying with the requirements in Sections 49, 50 and 50A 
does not arise for the period under reference (from 24.06.1999 
to 28.06.1999), because 'N' according to official police records, 
was arrested only on 28.06.1999. [Paras 12, 13 and 14)(670-G-
H; 671-A-D, F] 
1.2 Court is obliged to embark upon, when confronted with 
a proposition of the nature in hand, is to ascertain as to whether 
the alleged offence, attributed to the accused, had been 
committed by an accused "while acting or purporting to act in 
the discharge of his official duty". The official arrest of 'N' in 
terms of the pro\'isions of Cr.P.C.would extend during the period 
from 28.06.19<;9 to 30.06.1999. The above period of 
apprehension can legitimately be considered as, having been 
made "while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their 
official duties". The factual position expressed by the appellants 
is, that 'N' was not detained for the period from 24.06.1999 to 
28.06.1999. His detention during the above period, if true, would 
certainly not emerge froin the action of the accused while acting 
or purporting to act in the discharge of their official cl uties. If it 
emerges from evidence adduced before the trial Court, that 'N' 
was actually detained during the period from 24.06.1999 to 
28.06.1999, the said detention cannot be taken to have been 
made by the accused while acting or purporting to act in the 
discharge of their official duties. More so, because it is not the 
case of the appellants, that they had kept 'N' in jail during the 
period from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999. [Paras 12 and 17l[670-
F; 673-E-H; 674-A] 
SURINDERJIT SINGH MAND & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
655 
& ANR. 
1.3 Therefore, sanction u/s. 197 Cr.P.C., for prosecution 
A 
of the accused in relation to the detention of 'N' for the perio

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