LexSURINDER SINGH versus PUNJAB STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD, PATIALA AND ORS.
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• (2014] 11 S.C.R. 533 SURINDER SINGH v. PUNJAB STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD, PATIALA AND ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 6957 of 2009) SEPTEMBER 25, 2014 [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR AND ARLIN MISHRA, JJ.] Service Law - Appointment - "Backward class" category A B - Determination of "backwardness" - Identification of "creamy C layer" - Policy instructions issued by the State Government - Appointment of appellant from amongst "backward class" candidates - Challenged - High Court took into consideration the income of the appellant himself, to declare that he belonged to the "creamy layer'. and as such, was dis-entitled D to be considered as a "backward class" candidate - Validity -Held: Plain reading of the office memorandum dated 8. 9. 1993 made it clear that it was not the income of the individual concerned, but that of his parents, that determined whether he fell within the creamy layer or not - High Court E erred in reading down the office memorandum dated 8.9.1993 and to include therein the income of the individual concern while determining whether or not he fell within the "creamy layer' - Appointment of appellant restored. Allowing the appeal, the Court F HELD:1.1. On the plain reading of the office memorandum dated 8.9.1993, it is clear that it was not the income of the individual concerned, but that of his parents, that would determine whether he would fall G within the creamy layer or .not. The High Court erred in reading down the office memorandum dated 8.9.1993 and to include therein the income of the individual concern while determining whether or not he fall within the 533 H 534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R. A "creamy layer". [Paras 7, 9] [539-A, B; 541-A, B] 1.2. It is only the parents income, which has to be taken into consideration. The individual's income was not required to be clubbed with the income of his parents, 8 while determining whether or not he was eligible to be granted a backward class certificate. The determination to the contrary by the High Court is liable to be set aside. The appointment of the appellant is restored. [Paras 11, 12 and 13] [543-A, D-E] C Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India 1992 Supp. (3) SCC D E F 217: 1992 (2) Suppl. SCR 454 Ashok Kumar Thakur vs. State of Bihar (1995) 5 SCC 403: 1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 269; Ashok Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1 - relied on. Case Law Reference: 1992 (2) Suppl. SCR 454 ·relied on 1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 269 relied on (2008) 6 sec 1 relied on Para 8 Para 8 Para 9 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6957 of 2009. From the Judgment & Order dated 02.03.2009 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition No. 7660 of 2004. WITH G SLP(C) No. 17161 of 2009. Neeraj Kr. Jain, R.K. Kapoor, Shiwani Mahipal, Rekha Giri (for Anis Ahmed Khan), Jayshree Anand (for Anurag Pandey), Pratham Kant, Sanjay Singh, (for Ugra Shankar Prasad) for the H appearing parties. • • SURINDER SINGH v. PUNJAB STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD, PATIALA The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 535 A J.S. KHEHAR, J. 1. On 16.07.2002, the Punjab State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the 'Board') took a decision to fill up 21 posts of Accounts Officer. The above posts were to be filled up by way of direct recruitment. The appellant B earned 164 marks in the process of selection. He made the grade, by way of merit, from amongst "backward class" candidates. It is therefore, that he came to be appointed as Accounts Officer, by direct recruitment. 2. Respondent No.4-Anil Kumar Uppal, had also applied C for appointment by way of direct recruitment, in response to the same advertisement (in furtherance whereof, the appellant was selected and appointed). His candidature was, however, not accepted. It is therefore, that respondent no.4 approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh (hereinafter D referred to as the 'High Court') seeking an appropriate direction to the Board, requiring it to allow him (respondent no.4) to participate in the process of selection. By an interim order passed by the High Court, respondent no.4 was allowed to participate in the process of selection. E 3. On considering the candidature of respondent no.4, the Selection Committee awarded him 146 marks. It is therefore apparent, that in terms of merit, respondent no.4 could not march over the superior claim of the appellant. This was so F
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