SURINDER SINGH @CHHINDA AND ANR versus STATE OF PUNJAB

Citation: [2006] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. 671 · Decided: 31-08-2006 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Case Partly allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

SURINDER SINGH @CHHINDA AND ANR. 
A 
l' 
ST ATE OF PUNJAB 
-· 
AUGUST 31, 2006 
[ ARIJIT PASAYA T AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANT A, JJ.] 
B 
Penal Code, 1860; Ss. 34, 302, 304 & 323: Murder-Joint liability-
Accused persons attacked complainant and his son-Son succumbed to the 
injuries-Trial Court found all the four accused persons guilty of committing c 
offence under Section 3021323 rlw Section 34 /PC and sentenced them 
accordingly-Affirmed by High Court-Filing of appeal by two of the 
convicts-Held: Accused-appellants were not armed with weapons-Though 
they had allegedly restrained the movement of the deceased but there was 
no definite evidence to show that they shared common intention/motive to 
commit murder of the son of the Complainant-However, they came along D 
with other two accused who were armed with weapons, and after the incident, 
all of them left together-Under the circumstances, it would be inappropriate 
to punish the accused-appellants for offences under Section 302 rlw Section 
34 IPC-They could appropriately be convicted under Section 304 Part fl 
rlw Section 34-The conviction is altered accordingly. 
E 
Section 34-Joint liability-Scope of-Discussed 
According to the prosecution, on the fateful day, when the complainant 
... 
along with his son and two others were going towards the market, on the way, 
four persons including appellant stopped them. One of them allegedly gave a F 
lathi blow on the head of the complainant. When his son came to his rescue, 
two of the accused persons caught hold of him and other accused thrust a 
knife in his chest, and he fell down. The complainant raised a hue and cry, 
and the accused persons fled away. The victim was taken to a Civil Hospital, 
where he succumbed to the injuries. An F.l.R. was lodged by the complainant 
and others in the Police Station. The Police investigated the matter and G 
" 
submitted the charge-sheet. The trial Court found all the accused persons 
guilty and convicted them for committing offences under Section 302/323 r/ 
w Section 34 IPC and sentenced them accordingly. Accused persons preferred 
an appeal, which was dismissed by the High Court. Hence the present appeal, 
\ 
671 
H 
672 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. 
A which is preferred by only two of the accused persons. 
B 
Accused-appellants contended that since the prosecution has not 
brought any cogent evidence to show that they had shared common intention 
in committing the murder of the son of the complainant, Section 34 IPC is 
inapplicable. 
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. Section 34 IPC has been enacted on the principle of joint 
liability in doing a criminal act. The Section is only a rule of evidence and 
does not create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the Section is 
C the element of participation in action. The liability of one person for an offence 
committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several 
persons arises under Section 34 IPC, if such criminal act is done in 
furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in committing the 
crime.1675-F-GI 
D 
1.2. Direct proofof common intention is seldom available and, therefore, 
such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from 
the proved facts and circumstances of the case. In order to bring home the 
charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, 
whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of mind of 
E all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged 
with the aid of Section 34 IPC, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; 
but it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The true 
contents of the Section are that if two or more persons intentionally do an act 
jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it 
individually.1675-G-H; 676-AI 
F 
As/10k Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR (1977) SC 109, relied on. 
1.3. The existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a 
crime is the essential element for application of this Section. It is not 
necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with commission of an 
G offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be 
different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same 
common intention in order to attract the provision. 1676-81 
Mahbub Shah v. Emperor, AIR (1945) Privy Council 118, referred to. 

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