LexSURESH LOHIYA versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR.
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A SURESH LOHIYA v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR. AUGUST 23, 1996 B (G.N. RAY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.) Indian Forest Act, 1927: Sectio11s 2( 4), ( 6) & (7). 'Forest-produce'-Bamboo mat-Held : did 11ot include bamboo C mat-A forest produce changed into commercially new and disti11ct product ceased to be forest produce--'Trees' in S. 2( 4)(b )(i) refe1Ted to natural growth or products of trees and did 11ot i11clude mticles produced with aid of huma11 labou~171e seco11d pmt of defi11itio11 of 'timber' i11 S. 2(6) did not refer to 'fashioned' bamboo. D /11terpretatio11 of Statutes : Judicial Legislatio11-Held: Not pennissible-Cowt could not read in the defi11ition of a provi ~ion somethi11g which was 1101 there. I11temal aids-Definition-Held : Whe11 a word was defined in Act E Courl had to look to that defi11itio11 and not to ge11eral understanding of that word. F Words & Phrases : "Forest-produce''-Mea11i11g of-ln the context of Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. The r•espondents confiscated bamboo mat belonging to the appellant. However, t.he Additional Sessions Judge directed release of the bamboo mat. The revision petition filed by the respondents was allowed by the High G Court on the ground that the product confiscated was "forest-produce" within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred the present appeal. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the second part of the definition "timber" in Section 2(6) of the Act did not include bamboo H mat; and that only natural growth or product like flowers and fruits was 130 • c SURF.SH LOHIYAv. STATE 131 contemplated by the expression "produce of tree". On behalf of the respondents it was contended that if bamboo mat was held to be not a "forest-produce" it would denude the country's forest wealth. Allowing the appeal, this Court A B HELD : Though bamboo as a whole is forest-produce, if a product, commercially new and distinct, known to the business community as totally different is brought into existence by human labour, such an article and product would cease to be a forest-produce. The definition of "forest- produce" leaves nothing to doubt that it would not take within its fold an C article or thing which is totally different from forest-produce, having a distinct character. Therefore, were a product from bamboo is commercial· Iy different from it and in common parlance taken as a distinct product, the same would not be encompassed within the expression "forest-produce" as defined in Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 despite it being D inclusive in nature. Bamboo mat is taken as a product distinct from bamboo in the commercial world and, therefore, it is not a forest-produce in the eyes of law. [135-B-D] Fatesang Gimba Vasava v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1987) Guj 9, ap· proved. :E: Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, referred to. 2.1. Section 2(4)(b)(i) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 clearly indicates that such produce of tree alone is contemplated which is a natural growth or product like flowers and fruits. When the definition of "forest-produce" F is read in its entirety it would show that wherever the legislature wanted to include article produced with the aid of human labour, it has said so specifically as would appear from Section 2(4)(b)(iv) of the Act, as it speaks, apart from minerals etc. of "all products of mines or quarries". The second part of the definition of timber in Section 2(6) of the Act does G not take within its fold fashioned bamboo as that part is relatable to wood, and not tree because the definition of tree includes even canes, and a cane cannot be taken as a wood, even if a tree could be., [134-C-F] 2.2~ The legislature having defined "forest-produce", it is not permis· sible to read in the definition something which is not there. While forest H 132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. A wealth is required to be prest~rved, it is not open to the Court to legislate, as what a court can do in a matter like at hand is to iron out creases; it cannot weave a new texture. If there be any lacuna in the definition it is really for the legislature to tlllke care of the same. [134-F -HJ B c CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 430 of 1993. From the Judgment and Order dated 4.12.92 of the Bombay High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 57 of 1990. S.K. Dholakia and S.M. Ja
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