SUPREME GENERAL FILMS EXCHANGE LTD. versus HIS HIGHNESS MAHARAJA SIR BRIJNATH SINGHJI DEO OF MAIHAR & ORS
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
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23.7
SUPREME GENERAL FILMS EXCHANGE LTD.
v.
ms HIGHNESS MAHARAJA SIR BRIJNATH SINGHJI DEO OF
MAIHAR & ORS..
August 4, 1975
. [M. H. BEG ,AND A. C. GUPTA, JJ.]
Specific Rt'lief Act, 1877-S. 42---Scopc of Transfer
of
Properly
Act
s. 52 scope of.
The plaintiff-respondents was a mortgagee in respect of a cinema theatre of
which the appellant claimed to be a lessee in occupation. A comprom:se decree
was passed on 7th May, 1960 in the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent against
the n1ortg~gor by which it was agreed that the amounts due would be realised by
the sale of the theatre. The Central Bank of India, another creditor of the mort-
gagor, assigned its rights under the decree to the pla'..ntiff-respondent.
The
tBeatre was attached in the course of the execution of the decree. The original
lease of 1940 \Vhich the appellant cOmpany had entered into, expired in 1946
but the company continued as a tenant holding over until the impugned lease
dectl of -1956 was executed. The appellant company filed a suit in 1954 for the
spec:.fic performance of the agreement to lease. The lease deed of 1956 pur-
ported to carry out the terms of that compromise decree.
In this suit the plain-
tiff-respondent was not impleaded as a party.
J1ie plaintiff-respondent claimed
that the lease of 1956 was void as it was struck by ss. 52 and 65A of the Trans-
fer of Property Act and s. 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellant
company on the other hand, claimed that a suit of the nature filed by the pla'ntiff-
respondent di.d not lie as it fell outside the purview of s. 42 of the Specific Relief
:\ct, 1877.
The trial court decreed the plaintiff-respondent's suit.
The ~ppel
lant'-s appeal \vas dismissed by the High Court.
Dismissing ihe appeal,
HELD: (1) The circumstances in \Vhich a declaratory decree under s.
42,
Specific Relief Act should be awarded is a matter of discretion depending upon
the facts of each case.
A complete stranger whose interest is not affected by an-
other's legal character or who has no interest in another's property could not
get a declaration under s. 42, Specific Relief Act with reference to the legal
character or the property involved. S.uch is not the present case. The plaintiff-
respondent had not only· the rights of a nlortgagee decree-holder with regilrd, to
tile property involved, but he was also the assignee of the rights of the Bank
\Vhich had got the property in question attached in execution of its de:ree. The
p!::tintiff-respondent possessed sufficient legal interest in the theatre as a mortgagee
as well as an assignee of a decree-holder, who had got the property attached be-
fore he filed his su~t, so as to enable him to sue for the declarations he sought.
}{e was not seeking a merely whimsical or eccentric or an unreasonable declara-
tion of a right in property with no enforceable legal claims over it which could
' remain unaffec'.ed by the appellant's claims as a lessee.
[242G-243C]
Sfzeoparsan Singh & Ors. v. Ranu1anda11 Singh (since deceased)
& Ors. 43
I A 91 held inapplicable.
Deokali Koer v. Keda.r Nath ILR 39 Cal. 704 @ 707; Bai Shti ·vaktuha \'.
Thakore Agarsinghji Raisinghji ILR 34 Bombay 676 @ 680; Kishori Lal v. Bet:
Raj & Ors. AIR 1952 Punjab 3_87 and Ran1araghava Reddy & Ors. v. Kondurll
Scslrn Reddy & 2 Ors. [1966] (Suppl.) SCR p. 270 @ 277 referred to.
(2) The plaintiff needed a declaration and in the circumstances of the case
the declaration sought for could not be reasonably denied to him.
From the
plead'.ngs it is clear that the appe11ant had actually denied the plaintiff-respondent's-
rights as a mortgagee and also the validity of the compromise decree. The res-
pondents had reasonable grounds to apprehend that the appellant will rely upon
its alleged lease to resist delivery of actual possession to_ an auction purchaser.
The existence of lessee rights would certainly affect the price \Vhich an auction
purcha5er would be prepared to pay for the property.
[243C-F]
2-L839Sup.CI/75
238
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 s.c.R.
~3) A-s .the special doctrine of /is pendens is applicable the purported lease
of 1956 was invalid from the outset. The_ lease of 1956 purported to create en-
tirely new rights "[Jendente lite.
It \Vas therefore struck by tlie doctrine of /is
pendens embodied in s. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
The terms of the
ccn1promise decree in the appellant's suit against the mortgagExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
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