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SUPREME COURT LEGAL AID COMMITTEE REPRESENTING UNDERTRIAL PRISONERS versus UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

Citation: [1994] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 386 · Decided: 07-10-1994 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.M. AHMADI · Disposal: Disposed off

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
SUPREME COURT LEGAL AID COMMITTEE 
REPRESENTING UNDERTRIAL PRISONERS 
v. 
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 
OCTOBER 7, 1994 
[AM. AHMADI AND B.L. HANSARlA, JJ.) 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985, S.37. 
C 
Constitution of India Articles 14, 19 and 21-BaiH!ndertrials lan-
guishing in jails without trial on account of delay in constitution of special 
courts-Whether denial of speedy trial as well as of bail violative of fun-
damental rights under Articles 14, 19 and 21 and whether prosecutions ought 
to be quashed-Held, while prosecutions cannot be quashed since the offen-
ces are grave, deprivation of further liberty of undertrials who have been in 
D jail beyond half of the period of maximum sentence violative of Article 21 : 
detailed directions given for release on bail. 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 ss.36, 36A, and 
36D-Special Courts constituted in Bombay on January 4, 1991 but judge 
E appointed on April 6, 1991-Whether cases taken cognizance of by Court of 
Sessions in respect of offences after January 4 but prior to April 6 would stand 
transfe"ed and be dealt with by Special Coult-Held no : constitution of 
special court is complete only when judge is appointed. 
β€’ 
F 
After an amendment effective from May 29, 1989, S. 36A of the 
Narcotic Druge and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 ('Act') provided 
that all offences under the Act would be tried exclusively by the Special 
Conrt constituted under S.36. Till such constitution, the offences would be 
tried by the Court of Sessions. Sub-section (2) of S.36D dispensed with the 
need for transfer to the Special Court of cases already taken cognizance 
G of by the Court of Sessions. S. 37 made every offence under the Act 
cognizable and nonbailable. Bail could not be granted to a person accused 
of an offence punishable for a term of five years or more unless the public 
prosecutor was given an opportunity to o:ipose it and further only where 
the Court was satisfied that there were reasonable groJJnds for believing 
H 
that the accused was not guilty of the offence and was not likely to indulge 
386 
S.C.LA COMMITfEE v. U.O.J. 
387 
in similar activity. 
On account of the delay in the constitution of the special courts, 
cases under the Act Β·piled up. This coupled with the stringent conditions 
for grant of bail, led to a large number of undertrial prisoners languishing 
A 
in jails without trial. Invoking their fundamental right to speedy trial, the B 
petitioner in public interest petitioned the Court for quashing of the 
prosecutions and setting them at liberty. 
In Bombay although two Special Courts were constituted by a 
notification of Jannary 4, 1991, a judge was appointed to one of them, 
only on April 6, 1991; By a decision dated August 1, 1992, a single Judge C 
of the Bombay High Court, held that the Special Court contd be said to 
be constituted only on April 6, 1991 and that for trial of offences 
committed up to that date, the Sessions Court alone bad jurisdiction. 
On September 18, 1992 .a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the 
single Judge's ruling holding that under S.36D the Sessions Court would D 
be deemed to be a Special Court till such time the latter was constituted. 
Accordingly, cases filed after May 29, 1989 were to be tried only by the 
Special Court except where in the transitional preiod prior to its 
constitution, the Sessions Court bad 'substantially proceeded with the 
trial'. 
Disposing of the matter in respect of Maharashtra and issuing 
notices to the other States eliciting further information, this Court 
E 
HELD : 1.1. The offences were grave; the prosecutions could not be 
quashed and the accused persons whose trials were delayed beyond F 
reasonable time, could not be set free. [ 405-D] 
1.2. Further deprivation of personal liberty of persons who have 
suffered imprisonment which is half the maximum punishment would be 
violative of the fundamental right to speedy trial visualised by Article 21 G 
which bas to be telescoped with the right to a fair, just and reasonable 
procedure under Article 14. (405-C] 
f{ussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980] 1 SCC 
98; Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, [1983] 2 SCC 104; Kanar Singh v.State 
of Pu11jah, (1994] 3 SCC 569 andA.R. Antulay v. R.S. Naik, [1992] 1 SCC H 
388 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 
A 225, referred to. 
1.3. In view of the large pendency of cases, the undertrials would be 
released on bail 

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