SUNIL KUMAR BANERJEE versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS.
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/ ,. • 179 SUNIL KUMAR BANERJEE A v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS. March 26, 1980 [V. R. KRISllNA IYER, R. S. PATHAK AND 0. CmNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J B Service matter-All India Services Discipline and Appeal Rules 1969- Consultation with Vigilance Commissioner, if vitiates the order-Enquiry Offi· cer if combined the roles of prosecutor and judge-Reasonable opportunity, if )'- - denfrd. The appellant \\'as a n1en1ber of the Indian Administrative Service. In an C enquiry under rulC 8 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 against him the Commissioner for Departmental Enquiries, Vigilance Com. mission, West Bengal was appointed as the Enquiry Officer. He held that certain charges framed against the appellant were proved, certain others were partly proved and one was considered to be a technical omission mther than a serious lar-;e. The State Vigilance Commission expressed its view on the Enquiry Officer's Report. Thereafter, after consulting the Union Public Ser· :0. vice Comn1ission, the State Government, which was the Disciplinary Authority, imposed on the appellant the punishment of reduction in rank from the stage of Rs. 2,750 p.m. to the stage ·of Rs. 2,500 p.m. with certain other consequences. The appellant's writ petition was dismissed by a single Judge of the High Court and his appeal to the Division Bench was also dismissed. -In appeal to this Court it was contended by the appellant that instead cf holding the enquiry under the All India Services Disciplinary Rules, 1969 it was held under the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 which were repealed and that this caused prejudice to him; as required by rule 8 .(19) of the 1969 rules he v,.as not questioned with reference to the circumstances appearing against him which denied him that opportunity of explaining the circumstances which "eighed in the mind of the Enquiry Officer; the Gov~rnment should not have consulted the Vigilance Commis4 sioner \Vho had no statutory st..1.tus; though the ultimate finding was based on the report of the Vigilance Commission his report was not supplied to him; the Enquiry Officer combined in hin1self the role of prosecutor and judge and he \Vas denied a reasonable opportunity Of defending himself as important \vitness..::s were not called to enable hini to cross-examine them. Dismissing the appeal, HELD : 1. There is no substance in the contention that the 1955 ru!es and not 1969 rules were followed. The charges framed against the _appellant as well as in the first show-cause notice, the reference was clearly tO the 1969 rules. The appellant himself mentioned in one of his letters that the charges had been framed under 1969 rules. The enquiry report mentioned that the Enquiry Officer was appointed under the 1969 rules. [183 B-C]. 2. The appellant was' not questioned by the Enquiry Officer under rule $(19) of the 1969 rules. The failure tO comply with this requirement did E F G B I 180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS '(1980] 3 S.C.R. A not vitiate the enquiry unless the delinquent officer was able to establish pre· judice. [183 C-DJ B c E In the instant case the single judge as well as the Division Bench found that the appellant was in no way prejudiced by the failure to observe the requirement of rule 8(19). [183 G] 3. The provision incorporated in rule 8(19) is akin to section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 and section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1974. It is now well-established that mere non 8 examination or defec- tive examination under section 342 of the 1898 Code is not a ground for inter· ference unl.ess prejudice is established. [183 E-Fl · K. C. Mathew v. The State of Travancore-Cochin, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1057; Bibhutl Bhusan Das Gupta and Anr. v. State of West Bengal, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 104; referred to. 4. The appellant was not in the least prejudiced by the failure of the Enquiry Officer to question him in accordance with rule 8(19). He cross- examined the witnesses himself, submitted his defence in writing in great detail and argued the case himself at all stri.ges. The appellant was fully alive to the allegations against him ond dealt Vv·ith all aspects of the allegations in his written defence. [183 G-H, 184 A] 5. If the disciplinary authority arrived at its own conclusion on the mate- rial available to it, its findings and decision cannot be said to be tainted with any ille
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