SUNIL FULCHAND SHAH versus UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

Citation: [2000] 1 S.C.R. 945 · Decided: 16-02-2000 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.S. ANAND

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · cites 3 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

SUNIL FULCHAND SHAH 
v. 
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 
FEBRUARY 16, 2000 
[DR. A.S. ANAND, CJ., G.T. NANAVATI, K.T. THOMAS, 
D.P. WADHWA ANDS. RAJENDRA BABU, JJ.j 
Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Ac-
tivities Act, 1974 : Sections 10 and 12 
Preventive detention-Period of detention--Computation of-Has to be 
computed from the date of actual detention and not from the date of 
Detention Order. 
A 
B 
c 
Preventive detention-Grant of parole-Effect of-Held, parole does 
not intenupt the period of detention-That period should be counted towards D 
the period of detention-Period of detention does not stand automatically 
extended by any period of parole unless the order of parole or Rules or 
instTUctions specifically provided for extention of detention. 
Preventive detentioll-Detention order-Setting aside of by High Court E 
directing release of detenu-011 appeal Supreme Court reversing e"oneous 
decision of High Court and directing detention of detenu-Effect 011 remaining 
period of detention. 
Preventive detention-Parole during-Can be granted as per rules or 
administrative instTUctions-Detenu should approach the Govemment--ln 
F 
case of unjustifiable refusal by government High Court under Article 226 and 
Supreme Court under Articles 32, 136 and 142 can direct temporary release. 
Parole and Bail-Distinction betweell-Discussed. 
In these petitions the questions for consideration are : 
(i) Whether the period of detention is a fixed period running from 
the dates specified in the detention order and ending with the expiry of 
that period or the period is automatically extended by any period of parole 
granted to the detenu? 
945 
G 
H 
A 
946 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2000) 1 S.C.R. 
(ii) In a case where the High Court allows a habeas corpus petition 
and directs a detenu to be released and in consequence the detenu is set 
free and thereafter, on appeal the erroneous decision of the High Court is 
reversed, is it open to Supreme Court to direct the arrest and detention 
of the detenu, to undergo detention for the period which fell short or the 
B original period of detention intended in the detention order on account of 
the erroneous High Court order? 
c 
Disposing the petitions, the Court 
HELD : PER CURIAilJ 
Parole does not interrupt the period of detention and, thus, that 
period needs to be counted towards the total period of detention unless 
the terms for grant of parole, Rules or instructions, prescribe otherwise. 
PER MAJORITY (CJ., KT. Thomas, D.P. Wadhwa and S. Rajendra 
D Babu, JJ.) 
The quashing of an order of detention by the High Court brings to 
an end such an order and if an appeal is allowed against the order of the 
High Court, the question whether or not the detenu should be made to 
surrender to undergo the remaining period of detention, would depend 
E upon a variety offactors and in particular un the question of lapse of time 
between the date of detention, the order of the High Court, and the order 
of this Court, setting aside the order of the High Court. 
F 
PER MINORITY (G.T. NANAVATI, J.) 
If the period of detention is interrupted by order of court and on 
appeal that erroneous order is set aside the period during which the 
detenu was released pursuant to the order of court can be excluded while 
computing the maximum period of detention. 
G 
Per Dr. Anand, CJ. (for himself and for KT. Thomas, D.P. Wadhwa 
and S. Rajendra Babu, ff.) : 
1. On a plain reading of section 10 of the Conservation of l<'oreign 
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 it is evident 
that the period of detention is to be computed from the date of actual 
H detention and not from the date of the order of detention. 
S.I'. SI-Wf v. t: .O.I. 
947 
2. Section 10 prescribes not only the maximum period of detention 
but also the method of computation of that period and on a plain reading 
of the Section, the period of detention is to be computed from the date of 
actual detention and not from the date of the order of detention. The period 
of one or two years, as the case may be, as mentioned in Section 10 will 
run from the date of the actual detention and not from the date of the 
order of detention. Any other interpretation would frustrate the object of 
an order of detention and a clever person may abscond for the entire 
period mentioned in the order of detention and thereby render the order 
of detention useless claiming on being apprehended that 'the period has 
already exp

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