SUNDAR BABU AND ANR. versus STATE OF TAMIL NADU
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A B [2009] 3 S.C.R. 326 SUNDAR BABU AND ANR. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (Criminal Appeal No. 773 of 2003) FEBRUARY 19, 2009 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Quashing C of proceedings - Complaint against husband, his parents, sister and maternal grandmother under s.498A /PC and s.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act - Husband had purportedly left for USA six months after marriage - Complaint was filed long thereafter - No explanation for delayed lodging of complaint D - Petition under s.482 CrPC - Dismissed - On appeal, held: Scope for interference under s.482 is limited - However, interference can be made in cases as spelt out in Bhajan Lal's case - On facts, cursory perusal of complaint shows that the case at hand falls within category (7) of the illustrative E parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal's case - High Court erred in dismissing petition under s.482 CrPC - Penal Code, 1860 - s.498A - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - s.4. The wife of appellant no.1 filed a complaint against .- him and his parents, sister and maternal grandmother F alleging commission of offences punishable under s.498A IPC and s.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Appellant no.1 had purportedly left for USA six months after marriage. The complaint was filed long thereafter. No explanation for the delayed lodging of the complaint was G given. Appellants filed petition under s.482 CrPC contending that the complaint petition was nothing but an attempt to falsely implicate them and that continuance H 326 .. -- i .,. SUNDAR BABU AND ANR. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 327 of proceedings against them would be an abuse of the A process of law. The High Court dismissed the petition. Hence the present appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD:1.1. Though the scope for interference while B exercising jurisdiction under Sec.482 CrPC is limited, but it can be made in cases as spelt out in the case of Bhajan Lal. The illustrative examples laid down. therein are as follows: 1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken C at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; 2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable o offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Sec.156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Sec.155(2) of the Code; 3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the E same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; 4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an F order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Sec. 155 (2) of the Code; 5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding G against the accused; 6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in H 328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 3 S.C.R. A the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; 7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with ma/a fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance 8 on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. [Para 6] [332-8-H; 333-A-C] 1.2. Section 482 CrPC does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment C of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor D desirab
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