LexSUMER BUILDERS PVT. LTD. versus NARENDRA GORAN!
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A B c (2015] 10 S.C.R. 220 SUMER BUILDERS PVT. LTD. v. NARENDRA GORAN! (Civil Appeal No. 4267 of 2015) OCTOBER 15, 2015 [DIPAK MISRAAND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.] LETTERS PATENT: Clause 12-Applicability to letters patent of High Court judicature of Bombay- Held: Under s. 120 of the CPC, ss. 16, 17 and 20 are not applicable to the High Court in original civil jurisdiction - Thus Clause 12 would govern the D controversy so far Bombay High Court is concerned- Code ·of Civil Procedure, 1908 - ss. 16, 17, 20, 120. Clause 12 - Original jurisdiction as to suit - Suit for land - Agreement between parties to construct buildings - Land situated in Indore - Respondent handed over E possession of land to the appellant-developer tO start the work - Dispute arose between the parties - Appellant moved Bombay High Court for grant of leave under Clause 12 by filing an application uls.9 of AC Act - Leave granted - F Application for revocation of leave - High Court revoked the leave that was earlier granted- Whether justified- Held: s. 9 petition sought restraint by a temporary order or injunction from entering upon the property - Thus, core dispute pertained to possession of land -Any order passed uls. 9 of G AC Act would have the impact on the land- Therefore, it was clearly a dispute with regard to the possession which was evincible from the correspondences and the averments made in the application preferred u/s. 9 of AC Act- The suit is a suit for land and would have to be filed in Indore where H 220 SUMER BUILDERS PVT. LTD. v. NARENDRAGORANI 221 the land is situate - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - A s.9- Jurisdiction. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Under Section 120 of the Code of Civil 8 Procedure, 1908, Sections 16, 17 and 20 are not applicable to the High Court in original civil jurisdiction. Thus, as far as .the Bombay High Court is concerned, it is Clause 12 of the Letters Patent that would govern the controversy. [Para 13] [229-D] c 2. The High Court referred to the correspondences between the parties. In letter dated 19.6.2013, it was mentioned that as the owner of the land had terminated the development agreement and the MoU, he had taken D over the entire physical and actual possession of the said land and the developer was called upon to remove its machinery and construction material lying upon the said land. The said letter was replied by letter refuting the fact that the physical possession of the land had been E taken over by the land owner and stating that the possession was still with the developer. The agreement and the MoU clearly stated that the development agreement indubitably had created certain interests in the land in favour of the appellant Thus the core dispute F pertained to possession of the land, for the appellant claimed to be in exclusive possession and the respondent, per contra, has asseverated that it had taken over possession. It can irrefragably be stated that any order passed under Section 9 of the 1996 Act will have G the impact on the land. It is difficult to accede to the submission that it will not conceptually fall within the category of "suit for land" as engrafted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. It is clearly a dispute with regard H 222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 10S.C.R. A to the possession which is evinci.ble from the correspondences and the averments made in the application preferred under Section 9 of the 1996 Act. Thus, there has to be. determination as regards possession and impliedly issue of direction for recovery B of possession. Hence, the conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench on the basis of the scrutiny of documents that the dispute is embedded with regard to the possession of the land because the fundamental claim pertains to certain constructed space on the land and, C therefore, it would conceptually fall within the conception of "suit for land" appearing in Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is unexceptionable. [Paras 30, 33) [237-C-E; 240- E-H; 241-A-C] D E F ·G H Moolji Jaitha & Co. v. Khandesh Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 19SO FC 83; Shiv Bhagwan Moti Ram Saraoji v. Onkarmal /shar Dass & Ors. AIR 19S2 Bom.36S; Adcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Dau/at and Anr. (2001) 7 sec 698: 2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 29; P.M.A. Velliappa Chettiar v. Saha Govinda Doss AIR 1929 Mad. 721; Debendra Nath Chowdhury v. Southern Bank Ltd. AIR 1960 Cal. 626; Excel Dea
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