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SULOCHANA AMMA versus NARAYANAN NAIR

Citation: [1993] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 520 · Decided: 24-09-1993 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
SULOCHANA AMMA 
v. 
NARAYANAN NAIR 
SEPTEMBER 24, 1993 
[K. RAMASWAMY AND N.P. SINGH, JJ.] 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Explanation VIII to Sectionll--fntro-
duced by the Amending Act of 1976-Explanation to be read harmoniously 
with Section 11-0rder or issue arising directly and substantially between 
C parties-decided finally by a competent Court or tribunal even of limited 
jurisdiction including pecuniary jurisdiction-Subsequent proceeding between 
same parties raising issues decided in the earlier suit-Though ti.at Court of 
limited jurisdiction or special jurisdiction not competent to try the subsequent 
suit the earlier proceedings operate as res judicata. 
D 
Interpretation of Statutes: Explanation to a Section in a statute-Not a 
substantive provision by itself - but part and parcel or enactment - to be read 
harmoniously with Section to clear any ambiguity. 
By virtue of a settlement deed dated 19.5.1961 one 'K' got life estate 
E in respect of his wife's property and the remainder vested in favour of the 
respondent. After her death, 'K' alienated the property in 1972. Respon-
dent filed a suit to restrain 'K' from alienating the properties and commit-
ting acts of waste. During the pendency of the suit, appellant purchased 
the suit property. 
F 
The trial Court decreed the suit holding that 'K' bad no right to 
alienate the lands. Permanent injunction was issued restraining him from 
committing acts of waste. Appeal preferred by 'K' was dismissed. Since the 
appellant was not made a party in the suit, Respondent filed a fresh suit 
against 'K' and the appellant for perpetual injunction restraining them 
G from committing acts or waste. The suit was decreed, but the validity of 
the appellant's title was left open. Respondent filed another suit for 
declaration of bis title and possession against the appellant. The trial 
Court decreed the suit and granted mesne profits. Unable to succeed in 
the appeal and second appeal, appellant preferred the present appeal. 
H 
On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that S. 11 CPC and 
620 
SULOCHANA v. NAIR [RAMASWAMY, J.] 
521 
Explanatfon VIII thereof should be read harmoniously; that the Amending A 
Act of 1976 made no attempt to delete the words "Court competent to try 
such suit" in the main section, which would indicate that the legislature 
intended to retain the distinction between judgments of the Court of 
limited pecuniary jurisdiction which will not operate as res judicata to a 
later suit laid in a court of unlimited jurisdiction, on: the same issue 
between the same parties or persons under whom they claim title or 
litigating under the same title; that Explanation VIII only brought within 
B 
the fold of Section 11, the decree or order of the Courts of special 
jurisdiction, like probate Court, land acquisition Court, rent control Court 
etc; and that the non-obstante clause incorporated in Explanation VIII 
would only be in relation to such decrees; and that the purpose of the C 
explanation was only to remove that anomaly. 
Dismissing the appeal, this Court 
HELD: 1.1. A decree in a previous suit will not operate as res judicata, D 
unless the Judge by whom it was made, had jurisdiction to try and decide, 
not that particular suit, but also the subsequent suit itself in which the issue 
ls subsequently raised. This interpretation had consistently been adopted 
before the introduction of Explanation VIII. So the earlier decree of the 
court of a limited pecuniary jurisdiction would not operate as res judicata 
when the same issue is directly and substantially in issue in a later suit filed E 
in a court of unlimited jurisdiction. It had, therefore, become necessary to 
bring in the statute Explanation VIII. To cull out its scope and ambit, it 
must be read along with Section 11, to tind the purpose it seeks to serve. The 
Law Commission in its report recommended to remove the anomaly and 
bring within its fold the conclusiveness of an issue in a former suit decided p 
by any court, be it either of limited pecuniary jurisdiction or of special 
jurisdiction, like insolvency court, probate court, land acquisition court, 
Rent Controller, Revenue Tribunal, etc. No doubt the main body of Section 
11 was not amended, yet the expression '.'the court oflimite!Jjurisdiction" in 
Explanation VIII ia wide enough to include a court whose jurisdiction is G 
subject to pecuniary limitation and other cognate expression analogous 
thereto. Therefore, S

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