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SUKHDEV SINGH & ORS. versus GRAM SABHA BARI KHAD & ORS.

Citation: [1977] 2 S.C.R. 862 · Decided: 28-01-1977 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.K. GOSWAMI · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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862 
SUKHDEV SINGH & ORS. 
v. 
GRAM SABHA BARI KHAD & ORS. 
January 28, 1977 
[P. K. GOSWAMI AND Β·p, N. SHJNGl-TAL, JJ.] 
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act 1961, S. 2(g) 
proviso 
(iv), application to land under possession of owners. 
The appellants filed a suit for a declaration that the suit land inherited by 
them was not "shamlat deh" within the meaning of section 2(g) of the Punjab 
Village Common Land (Regulation) Act, 1961, because Β·it was excluded 
by 
virtue of proviso (iv.) to the clause. 
They contended that the revem1e records 
describing the land as "shamlat deb" also stated it to be "in possession of the 
owners", showing that it was not used as "shamlat deh'', and furthermore, that 
it had been partly purchased and partly received as gift by their ancestor before 
26th January, 1950, and thereby came within the scope of s. 2(g) proviso (iv) 
of the Act. The appellants failed before the Trial Court, Court of first appeal, 
and the High Court in second appeal. 
Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court, 
HELD : ( 1) The fact that in 1914-15 it was recorded in the 'jamabandi' 
as "shamlat deh", shows that that particular character of the land was recognis-
ed even so far back, and it could not detract from that nature of the 
land 
merely because it was further stated in tbe 'jamabandi' that it was in the pos-
session of the owners "as per respective shares in khewat". 
[863 F-G] 
(2) Proviso (iv) requires that in order to be excluded from the category 
of "shamlat deb", the land should have been acquired by purchase or in ex-
change for proprietary land from a co-sharer in the "shamlat deb", which is 
not so in the case of the appellants. [863 G] 
CIVIL .APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 527 of 1975. 
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 
6-9-74 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 933 of 
1970. 
K. L. Gosain, N. N. Goswamy and Arvind Minocha for the Appe-
llant. 
" 
Gokal Chand Mittal, J. D. Jain, Arun Jain and (Miss) K. Migkmi 
for Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
SHINGHAL, J.-The plaintiffs who have been unsuccessful in the 
trial court, the court first appeal, and the High Court in 
second 
appeal, have filed the present appeal by special leave. 
They raised 
their suit for a declaration that the suit land continued to be in their 
ownership in spite of the provisions of the Punjab Village Common 
Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the 
Act. 
They pleaded that the land had been purchased by their 
ancestor 
Udham Singh, who founded the village, from Raja Sansar Chand of 
Dholwaha, some time before 1884, and that some other land 
was 
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, 
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SUKHDEV SINGH v. GRAM SABHA (Shinghal, J.) 
86Β°3 
gifted to him by one Smt. Dhani. 
They claimed that what they had 
thus acquired was not "shamlat deh" within the meaning of clause (g) 
of section 2 o'f the Act because it was excluded by virtue of 
sub-
clause (iv) of the proviso to the clause. 
That contention has been 
negatived all through, and the short question for decision is whether 
:my interference is called for with that view . 
It ha,s not been disputed before us that the land in questiolll was 
described in the revenue records as "shamlat deh'', . and 
excluded 
"abadi deh." 
That has in fact been amply proved by the 'jamabandi' 
of the year 1914-15 which has been produced by the 'plaintiffs them-
selves and its genuineness has not been controverted before us. 
As 
such, by virtue of the definition of "shamlat deh" in clause 
(g) of 
section 2, the suit land fall within the definition of "shamlat deh". 
The question remains whether it was excluded from that definition by 
virtue of sub-clause (iv) of the proviso to clause (g) which reads as 
follows.-
"(iv) having been acquired before the 26th January, 1950, 
by a person by purchase or in exchange for proprietary land 
from a co-sharer in the shamilat deh is so recorded in the 
jamabandi or is supported by a valid deed;" 
It has been argued by counsel for the appellants that as the suit 
land was recorded in the aforesaid Jamabandi as "village shamilat'', 
in possession of the owners, it should be held that the land was 
not 
used as "shamlat deh." 
Counsel has argued further that as 
the 
land was purchased by the plaintiffs' ancestor Udham Singh who had 
founded the vil1age, from Raja Sansar Chand, and a part of it was 
.received by way of gift from

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