SUDHIR KUMAR & ORS. versus BALDEV KRISHNA THAPAR & ORS.
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114
SUDHIR KUMAR & ORS.
v.
BALDEV KRISHNA THAPAR & ORS.
October 28, 1969
{J. C. SHAH AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.]
Landlord and Tenant-Option of renewal in lease deed subject to
lessor's consent-When lessor could withhold consent.
Suit for ejectment-Compromised-Les.s.ee allowed to
continue
in
possession till a particular date on terins and conditions of original Iease-
Whether fresh lease or mere extension af time for delivery of pOssession-
Whether renewal clause operativ'e.
One of the terms of the lease relating to a cinema house was that
after the expiry of the lease, the lessee shall have the option to renew
the. lease with the consent of the lessor, At the end of the lease oeriod,
the lessor brought a suit for ejectment, but died during its pendeoey. On
December 23, 1958. the suit was compromised between the legal represon-
tatives of the lessor and the lessees.
By the compromise. the tenancy was
continued till December 31, 1962 on the terms and conditions of
the
original lease, and the lessees were to vacate the premises on January
1~
1963. One of tho legal representatives sold his share in the. cinema house
to the appellant who sought execution of the compromise decree
on
January 4, 1963. The respondents (lessees) contended that the compro-
miseΒ· created a fresh lease, that the decree was only a declaratory one
and that they were entitled to an extension of the lease on the basis of
the renewal clause incorporated into the fresh lease.
HELD: (1) The question whether under the terms of a compromise
the parties entered into a fresh lease or were only granted an extension
of time for delivery of possession depends upon the intention of parties
as. expressed in the compromise and the decree based on it.
On .the terms
of the compromise in the present case,
the lessors bad granted a fresh
lease and the lessees were given the option to renew the lease, which was
one of the terms of the original lease, at the end of the term fixed. that
is 31st Decembe.r 1962. Hence, the direction in the compromise decree
to vacate at the end of the term would be ineffective and would
not
amount to an ejectment decree. It is at best a declaration of the right
of the lessors to eject the lessees at the end of the le.ase period if 1he
le,sees fail to get a renewal. [118 B-C, G-H; 119. A-Bl
(2) Merely because the compromise had
fixed the period
during
which the. respondents continued as lessess, it did not mean, that the re-
newal clause in Β·the original lease had not become one of the terms of the
agreement. [119 D-E]
(3) Nor was the renewal clause meaningless on the ground the lessees
were entitled to a renewal only if the lessors consented. The right of
the lessors to give consent must be read in the context of the lessees' en-
titlement to get the renewal.
So read. the lessors could withhold their
consent either because of the lessees' failure to observe one or other of
the material terms of the lease or on some other re.asonable ground. ,The
lessor could _not unreasonably withhold consent when the ~essee exercised
the option of renewal. (119 E-G; 120 A-BJ
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SUDH!R v. B. K. THAPAR (Hegde, J.)
115
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeals Nos. 2557
and 2558 of 1966.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated July 23, 1965 of
the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Civil First Misc. Appeals
Nos. 20 and 30 of 1964.
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V. M. Tarkunde, P. C. Bhartari, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C.
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Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants.
A. K. Sen, Inder Das Grover and J. P. Aggarwal, for respon-
dent.No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hegde, J.-These connected appeals ari~e from an execution
proceeding.
The question for determination in these appeals is
whether the decree under execution is executable ? The learned
single judge of the High Court of .J ammu & Kashmir before whom
the execution was levied came to the conclusion that the decree is
execvtable but the execution petitioners, who are entitled to a
fraction of the interest in the suit properties can only have joint
possession of the same along with the judgment debtors who had
acquired by purchase a ten annas share in those properties. Both
the appellants as well as responden.ts 1 and 2 appealed against the
order of the learned single judge.
The appellate bench of that
High Court reversed the decree of the learned single judge. It
came to the conclusion that the decree iExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
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