SUBHASH CHANDRA versus MOHAMMAD SHARIT AND ORS.

Citation: [1989] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 534 · Decided: 19-12-1989 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: L.M. SHARMA · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
SUBHASH CHANDRA 
V. 
MOHAMMAD SHARIT AND ORS. 
DECEMBER 19, 1989 
B 
'[LALIT MOHAN SHARMA AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.] 
c 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Section 116--Doctrine of estoppe/-
Tenant's denial of landlord's title-Permissibility of-Title derived by 
subsequent landlord can be challenged but title of original landlord 
cannot be challenged. 
M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961: Section 12-Eviction 
-Plea of estoppel by tenant-Permissibility of. 
The respondents claimed to be the owners of the suit property by 
virtue of a registered sale deed in their favour by one Navinchand, who 
had purchased the property from his predecessor-in-interest Smt. Raj 
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Rani on 11.8.1952. The appellant's father Misri Lal was her tenant. 
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In 1959 a suit was filed by Navinchand for eviction of Misri Lal, 
which was resisted by the tenant on the ground that Smt. Raj Rani had 
earlier transferred the house to a Trust and as such she could not later 
convey any title to Navincha!}d. The Trial Court rejected the defence, 
and passed a decree against Misri Lal. Misri Lal filed an appeal. During 
its pendency, the parties resolved their dispute, by entering into a 
compromise. A deed Ext. P. 20 creating a fresh lease in favour of Misri 
Lal under Navinchand as lessor, was executed w.e.f. 1.12.1962. A com-
promise petition Ex. P. 21 was filed and the case decreed in terms of the 
compromise Ex. P. 22 Misri Lal continued to occupy the house till he 
died in 1972 leaving behind his son, the appellant. 
A fresh dispute started after N avinchand sold the suit property to 
the respond~ts-plainti!Ts on 4.1. 73, who gave notice of the sale to the 
appellant on 14.3. 73. As the appellants refused to recognise them as 
owners, the respondents terminated the tenancy and filed a suit for 
ejectment against the appellants. This suit was resisted on the same old 
plea that Smt. Raj Rani having transferred the suit property to a Trust 
was not competent to retransfer the property to Navinchand the vendor 
of the respondents. The trial court disbelieved the defence version hold-
ing that although Smt. Raj Rani had executed a trust deed in 1936, but 
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the same was not acted upon and that the trust did not appear to have 
come into existence. The suit was accordingly decreed. 
534 
S. CHANDRA v. M. SHARIT 
535 
On appeal, the first appellate court reversed the above finding 
and held that the defendant could not be estopped from challenging the 
title of the plaintiffs. 
In second appeal, the High Court reversed the decree of the First 
Appellate Court, and held that the defendants were estopped from 
challenging the decree, Ext. P. 22 which would bind the parties since it 
was founded on a compromise, and not on an adjudication by the court 
on the question of title. It also observed that the statement made_ in the 
compromise petitition Ex. P. 21 in the earlier suit supported the case of 
the plaintiffs independently of the compromise decree and that the 
defence plea had to be rejected in view of the deed Ext. P. 20 creating a 
fresh lease. 
In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the 
appellant that having regard to the limited scope of a second appeal 
under section 100 C.P.C., the High Court was not justified in setting 
aside the finding of the Appellate court on the question whether the 
property had been alienated in 1936 in favour of the trust or not, that 
having reached a conclusion against the defendant on the basis of the 
lease deed Ex. P. 20, the compromise petition Ex. P. 21 and the com-
promise decree Ext. P. 22, it should not have proceeded to decide the 
dispute relating to title on merits on the basis of evidence. 
It was further contended that the appellant/tenant· cannot be 
estopped from challenging the derivative title of the plaintiffs as he was 
not inducted into the house by them. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, 
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B 
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E 
HELD: 1. The doctrine of estoppel ordinarily applies where the 
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tenant has been let into possession by the plaintiff. Where the landlord 
had not himself inducted the tenant into the disputed property and his 
rights are founded on a derivative title, for example, as an assignee, 
donee, vendee, heir, etc., the position is a little different. [539D] 
2. A tenant already in possession can challenge the plaintiff's 
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claim of derivative title showing that the real owner is somebody else, 
but this is subject to the rule enunciated by section 116 of the Evidence 
Act, whic

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