SUBBEGOWDA (DEAD) BY LR. versus THIMMEGOWDA (DEAD) BY LRS.

Citation: [2004] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 277 · Decided: 16-04-2004 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.C. LAHOTI · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

SUBBEGOWDA (DEAD) BY LR. 
v. 
THIMMEGOWDA (DEAD) BY LRS. 
APRIL 16, 2004 
[R.C. LAHOTI AND ASHOK BHAN, JJ.] 
law of Property: 
Settlement deed-Revocation-Right of sett/or-Sett/or executing a deed 
A 
B 
and vesting suit properties in settlee stipulating certain conditions-Suit for C 
restoration of possession of suit properties on ground of fraud and 
misrepresentation-Trial Court and first appellate court holding that sett/or 
has no right of revocation of deed-High Court held in favour of sett/or-On 
appeal, held, intention of the sett/or has to be decided from the contents of the 
deed-On facts, on plain reading of the deed. the settlement was not a transfer D 
of property but an arrangement/entrustment of suit property for certain purposes 
with a power of revocation by sett/or. 
Respondent, having no male issue, adopted appellant No. 2, who is 
the son of his brother-appellant No. 1. The respondent executed a 
settlement deed in favour of appellant No. 2 stipulating certain conditions. E 
Respondent filed a suit before trial court against appellant nos. 1 and 2 
for setting aside the settlement deed on ground of fraud and 
misrepresentation and the consequential relief of restoration of possession 
over the suit properties. Trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that 
fraud and misrepresentation were not proved. The first appeal was also 
dismissed. High Court allowed the second appeal holding that the power F 
of revocation of settlement deed was expressly reserved to himself in the 
deed and hence the respondent was justified in invoking the revocation 
clause. Hence the appeal. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. The question of construction of a document is to be 
decided by finding out the intention of the executant, firstly, from a 
comprehensive reading of the terms of the document itself, and then, by 
looking into, to the extent permissible, the prevailing circumstances which 
\)tnuadcd the author of the document to execute it. If the executant 
G 
2n 
H 
278 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R. 
A intended to transfer property, the Court would lean in favour of holding 
the transferee having been vested with interest in the property. Where an 
intention to transfer property within the meaning of Section S of the 
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 cannot be spelt out, the document will be 
given effect to as it reads and as is explicit from what is set out in the 
B deed itself. [281-G-H; 282-A-BI 
Raj Bajrang Bahadur Singh v. Thakurain Bakhtrai Kuer, AIR (1953) 
SC 7 and Phillip John v CIT Calcutta, AIR (1964) SC 587, reffered to 
1.2. The respondent had not specifically created any interest in 
favour of his adopted son in any of the properties owned by him. A 
C comprehensive reading of the document shows that the settlement as per 
the terms of the document was not a transfer of property in favour of the 
adopted son. It was merely an arrangement or an entrustment of the suit 
property to his adopted son and the latter's natural father for the purpose 
of proper management without obstruction by anyone else including 
D himself so that the welfare of himself, his wife and his children, specially 
the unmarried daughters, was assured. Though the pleas of frauc~ and 
undue influence vitiating the execution of deed are not substantiated, yet 
there can be no denying of the fact that appellant no. 2 and his natural 
father did not come up to those expectations of the respondent which had 
persuaded him as primary and essential considerations for the execution 
E of the deed. Nothing prevented the respondent from cancelling such 
settlement and depriving appellant no. 2 and his natural father from 
management over the scheduled property. The stray sentence at the end 
of the document cannot be read in isolation dissected from the earlier part 
of the document which clearly demonstrates the intention of the executant 
F of entrusting the management only of the suit property to appellant no. 2 
and his natural father. This is further clarified from the additional 
statement made by settlor-respondent just before concluding the execution 
of the document where he said that appellant no. 2 having been entrusted 
to the care and custody, as adopted son of the respondent, he was executing 
the deed with an intention to maintain the settlee for his life~ There is no 
G recital in the de.ed which may be read or be capable of being construed as 
a demise in praesenti vesting absolute title in

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