LexSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH versus JOGENDRA SINGH
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2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
197
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
v.
JOGENDRA SINGH
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH and
J. C. SHAH JJ.)
Public Servant-Disciplinary
l'roceedings-Proc<iluro-
"M ay" -Construction
of-U. P. Di,ciplinary
Procuiling•
(Administrative Tribunal) Rul.s, 1.947, r. 4 (2).
The respondent was appointed a Naib Tehsildar under
the appellant, in the year 1937. On August 4, 1952, he was
suspended on complaints received against him and his case was
referred for investigation
to the Administrative Tribunal
appointed under the Rules. While the proceedings were
pending, additional complaints were received by the appellant
against his conduct
and they
were
communicated to
the
Tribunal
with
an intimation that the appellant
proposed to send those further charges against the respondent
for enquiry. The Tribunal did not wait for receipt of the said
additional charges and on enquiry exonerated him from the
charges framed against him, in August, l 952. On October
28, 1956, the respondent was again suspended and the charges
framed on the additional complaints were de livered to him.
The respondent submitted his explanation and pleaded that
the enquiry
might
be entrusted
to the
Administrative
Tribunal in accordance with the Rules; but his request was re ..
jected and the case was entrusted to the Commissioner with
directions to take disciplinary proceedings against him. The
High Court allowed the writ petition of the respondent and
the order directing the enquiry to be held by the appointed
authority under r. 55 of the said Civil Services Rules was
quashed.
The question for decision in this Court was, whether like
the word "may" in r. 4 (!) which confers the discretion on the
Governor, the word "may" in sub-r. (2) confers discretion on
him, or does the word "may" in sub-r. (2) really mean "shall"
or "must".
,
Held, that the whole purpose of r. 4 (2) would be frustra-
ted if the word "may" in the said rule receives the same con-
struction as in sub-r. (I).
The plain and unambiguous
object of enacting rule 4 (2) is to provide an option to the
1963
19f3
Sl4l1 •f Uttf:T P1adtJl1
••
Jo&ttuira Sinih
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] vot.
Gazetted Government scrvanu to request the Governor that
their cases should be tried by a Tribunal and not otherwise.
'fhus r. 4 (2) irnposes au obligation on thr. Governor to grant a
request n1adc hy the Gazetted ('.,rl)vcrnn1ent Servant and such a
request ~at having ~en granted in the present case, the appeal
must fail.
C1v11, Al'PELLATE J URISDIC'f!ON : Civil Appeal
No. 30 l of l!J61.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
l\farch 10, 1960, of the
Allahabad High Court
(Lucknow Bench) in Special Appeal No. 40 of
1959.
K. S. Hajela, and C. P. Lal, for the appellant.
K. L. Gosain
and lSaunit
Lal,
for
the
respondent.
Hl63. March 4. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR J .-The short point of law
which arises in this appeal relates to the construction
of Rule 4 (2) of the Uttar Pradesh Disciplinary
Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947
(hereinafter called the Rules). That question arises
in this way. The respondent Jogcndra Singh was
appointed a Naib Tchsildar under the appellant, the
State of U. P. in the year l!l37.
O.n August 4, 1952,
he was suspended as complaints had been received
against him and an enquiry into the said complaints
was
contemplated.
Accordingly,
charges
were
framed against him am! his case was referred for
investigation to the Administrative Tribunal appoin-
ted under the Rules.
The Tribunal held an enquiry
and exonerated the
respondent from the charges
framed against him, in August 1953.
While the proceedings before the Tribunal were
pending, additional complaints were received by the
2 s.a.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
199
appellant against the respondent's conduct, and they
were communicated by the appellant to the Tribunal
with ~n intimation that the appellant proµosed to
send those further charges against the respondent for
enquiry.
The Tribunal did not wait for receipt of
the said additional charges because it was asked by
the government to proceed with the charge already
with it and concluded its enquiry. That is why on
October 28, 1955, the respondent was again suspen-
ded and charges framed on the additional com-
plaints received against him were delivered to him
on October 29, 1956. On November 12, 1956,
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