STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. versus ARVIND KUMAR SRIVASTAVA & ORS.
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(2014) 12 S.C.R. 193 STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ARVIND KUMAR SRIVASTAVA & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 9849 of 2014) OCTOBER 17, 2014 [J. CHELAMESWAR AND A.K. SIKRI, JJ.] Service jurisprudence - Service matters - Principles to A B be applied - Held: When a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons C need to be treated alike by extending that benefit, or else would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Art. 14 - However, the principle is subject to exceptions in the form of /aches and delays as well as acquiescence - Where judgment of the Court was in rem with intention to give benefit D to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not, the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person - And where judgment was in personam, the benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court - On E facts, respondents challenged the cancellation order of their appointment after a period of nine years, on finding that some other persons whose appointment orders were also cancelled had got the relief - There was unexplained delay and /aches in filing the claim petition after 9 years - Respondents have F not joined the service nor working like the employees who succeeded in earlier case before the tribunal -Thus, respondents cannot be given appointment as of today, after a period of 27 years. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 Normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by 193 G H 194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 12 S.C.R. A extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in servi<;e matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time B postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. However, this principle is subject to well c recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who D had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the E acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation F is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation. On the other hand, if the judgment of the G Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the H STATE OF U.P. v. ARVIND KUMAR SRIVASTAVA 195 said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that A their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence. [Para 23] [215-H; 216-A-H; 217- A-B] 1.2. In the instant case, the selection process took 8 place in the year 1986. Appointment orders were issued in the year 1987, but were also cancelled vide orders dated June 22, 1987. The respondents did not challenge these cancellation orders till the year 1996, i.e. for a period of 9 years. It means that they had accepted the cancellation of their appointments. They woke up in the C year 1996 only after finding that some other persons whose appointme
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