STATE OF U.P. versus SAYED ABDUL JALIL
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342 STATE OF U.P. v. SAYED ABDUL JALIL February 1, 1972 [S. M .. S!KRI, C.J., A. N. RAY AND M. H: BEG, JJ.] A1aho1n111edan law-Order of Muslim ruler of Princely State a.Uotting .l1ouse-lf would n1J1ount to a gift of the corpus-Whether operates tu a grnnt of life e:-.·tate or a revocable licenct-lndian Evidence Act ( 1 o/ 1872), s. 92 proviso (6)-Admissihilit,v of other el'idtnce. Pursuant to an order by a Muslim ruler of an erstwhile princely-State, th..: respondent \VUs allotted a house o:ind he \\'as Jiving in it. After the merger of th·~ princely-State with the appellant-State, rent was demanded from the res~ondent and he filed a suit for a declaration that he was the o\vner in possession of the house; and in the 3(tefnative; that he was a licensee entitled to remain in possession for life without payment of any rent. The High Court, in sec~:md appeal, held that the use of the Urdu words 'inteqal' and 'atta' showed that the Ruler intended the order to be a valid declaration of gift under Mohammedan Law and that when the respondent took possession of the house, he became its owner. The High Court also held that no other evidence was admissible for deciding on the Ruler's intention. - Allowing the appeal to this Court, HELD : ( 1) There being no mention in the order either of riahts of · ownership or those of a life .. estate holder, the mere use of the two words, did not determine what was meant' to be granted. The word 'inteqal' is used in connection with a transfer of property, but in the context of its use here, it could only indicate that the respondent was to )lave chanae or tramfer his residence in the physical sense. The word 1atta' iS: used to denote all kinds of grants including a. mere permission to live in ~ house. Therefore. assuming tbat the order reduced the terms of a grant to writing, oral and other eYidence was both necessary and. admissible under s. 92, proviso (6), Evidence Ac~, to resolve the latent ambiguity. The evidence adduced in the case, however, is more consistent with the view th~t the Ruler meant to resolve the immediate financial difficulty of the respondent by giving him free residential accommodation than with a conferment of the ownership of or a life interest in the house. [346 B-H] ( 2) There wos no declaration of any gift either of the corpus or the usufruct and the admissible evidence relating to the nature of the transac- · tion, which the High Court should have considered, showed, th~t the transaction amounted to nothing more than a grant of '1 licence revocable at the grantor's option. From the mere expenditure by the respondent of money over some necessary repairs, an inference of a larger gfant O'Jnnot be drawn. [347 C-EJ CML APPELLATE JUP.ISD!CTION : Civil Appeal No. 279 of 1967. A c D p G H A B c D E F G H U.P. STATE V. ABDUL JALIL (Beg, J.) 343 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated September 15, 1966 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 222 of 1960. G. N. Diks/1it and 0. P. Ran.a, for the appellants. E. C. Agrawala, for respondents Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Beg, J. There are two appeals by Special Leave before us, Leave, against the Judgment a.nd decree of a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing a plaintiff's se.cond appeal The plaintiff's case was that the Governmeur of Rampur had given him a house "under the orders of His Highness the Nawab of Rampur, passeq on 23rd June, 1945". It appears that, after the merger of Rampur State in Uttar Pradesh in 1949, when Rampur became a district of Uttar Pradesh, this house was given by the Governme.nt of Uttar Pradesh to the Municipal Board of R&mpur, Defendant-Appellant, which c!emanded rent from the plaintiff by notice. On the plaintiff's refusal to pay, the house was attached on 23rd February, 1955. The plaintiff deposited a sum of Rs. 100- under protest. He then filed his suit, on 26-10-56, for a declaration that he is the own~r in possession of the house, and, in the alternative, that he is a "licensee" entitled to remain in possession of the house for life without payment of rent. - The defendants, the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Municipal Board of Rampur, and the Public Works Department at Rampur, · d~med the alleged gift of either the ownership or of a life-intere!ll in the house to the plaintiff. They also pleaded that there was no relationshi
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