STATE OF U.P. versus RAGHUBIR SINGH

Citation: [1996] SUPP. 10 S.C.R. 91 · Decided: 13-12-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M.M. PUNCHHI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

STATE OF U.P. 
v. 
RAGHUBIR SINGH 
DECEMBER 13, 1996 
(M.M. PUNCHHI AND K.T. THOMAS,.JJ.) 
Penal Code, 1860---Section 364/304 r/w Sec. 34-Conviction by Tlial 
Court-Acquittal by High Court-On appeal, held High Court not justified in 
interfering with the well reasoned order passed by the Trial Court-Conviction 
and sentence passed by Trial Court-Vpheld. 
A 
B 
c 
Evidence Act, 1872-Sections 1511155/140---lndecent and scandalous 
question on the moral character of the witnesS-Child of the witness was 
kidnapped and murdered-Paternity of the child was not in the issue-Mur-
derer cannot escape by establishing that the mother was of loose 
moral~Such question to shake the credit of another witness or party should D 
not be allowed. 
The accused (A-1) and the deceased were brothers and sons of PW-1. 
A-1 married the daughter of accused A-2 and ·both were residing in the 
same city. Since the death of his father, A-1 was pressurising his mother, E 
PW-1, to give him the property left behind by his father. But she did not 
yield to such pressures. On one occasion, both the accused went to the 
village and started ploughing the land, which was resisted by PW-1. A-1 
threatened her that should she persist with her resistance he would finish 
off her remaining male heir, the deceased. But she did not take it seriously. 
On 29.11.1997, while the deceased child was playing on the roadside, 
near his residence, both the accused caught him and dragged him towards 
F 
the engine shed of PW-2. Hearing the child scream, his mother PW-1 and 
some neighbours gathered at the place. But as they moved to rescue the 
child, A-1 whipped out a pistol and threatened to kill them. Thereafter, the G 
accused took the child inside the engine shed and killed him by throttling 
and dumped his dead body in a pit. When the killers slipped away, the 
neighbours rushed to the shed and found the dead body of the child lying 
submerged in the pit. 
· 
Both the accused were arrested and challaned before the Trial Court. H 
91 
92 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l996) SUPP.10 S.C.R. 
A The Trial Court relied upon the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3 and convicted 
,the accused under Sections 364 and 302 along with Sec. 34 of IPC. 
The Division Bench of the High Court observed that 'the Trial <;:ourt 
has not cared to look into the statement of the DW-1, who was the daughter 
of PW-1' and ··eversed the conviction. Hence, State moved this appeal by 
B special leave!, · 
c 
The appellant-State contended that the High Court was totally un-
justified in inter(ering with fair dealing to the defence witness and with the 
well reasoned conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court. 
Allowing the appeal, this Court 
HELD : 1.1. If the evidence of the P.Ws. 1 to 3 had been accepted, 
there would have been no escape for the accused from conviction. But the 
High Court swept off the evidence of PW-1 solely on the ground that her 
D daughter, DW·l spoke derisively of her moral character and instead of 
considering the worth of evidence, niggled on some irrelevant features and 
bypassed the other evidence of PW·2 and PW-3. Where PW·l gave evidence 
that her son was murdered, there was little scope for conducting any 
inquiry, into her moral life. Law does not permit even the child of a 
E prostitute to be murdered. In such a case, murderer cannot escape by 
establishing that the mother of the child was of loose morals. The evidence 
of the defence witness, DW·l was therefore, quite unnecessary and ir-
relevant. Since the paternity of the child was not in the "facts in issue", the 
entire discussion of the High Court which appears to be focussed on the 
moral character of the mother is entirely improper. (95-E-F; 98-A-B; 98-E] 
F 
2. The questions to elicit inilecent or scandalous imputations from 
witnesses in the guise to shake the credit of another witness of party should 
not have been permitted by the courts. Sec. 151 of the Evidence Act 
empowers every Trial Court to forbid such questions "although such 
G questions or inquiries may have some bearing on the question before the 
Court, unless they relate to facts in issue". Hence, High Court erred in 
relying on such testimony and reversing a well-merited conviction. Since 
accused A·l died during pendency of this appeal, only the conviction of 
accused A·2 passed by the Trial Court is restored. [97·B·C; 99"B·C] 
H 
Mahammad Mian v. Emperor, 32 Indian Cases 54 and Subala Das v. 
STAIB v. RAGHUBIR SINGH [THOMAS, J.) 
93 
Indr

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