STATE OF U.P. versus P.A. MADHU
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• 1 A STATE OF U.P. v P.A. MAOHU 17 July, 1984 [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, JJ.] Constitution of India-Art. 136-Supreme Court-When woufd Interfere ·with the appreciation of evidence by the High Cpurt. B c Code ofCrim;nal Procedure-S. 154-FJR-Cryptlc information on phone D to police-Cannot be treated as FIR-Being first in point oftims make no diffe- rence-Name of assailant not mentioned in telephonic message-Whether discredits prosecution case . The respondent, Secretary of the workers union of a construction company, D.W. 1, Vice-President of the Union, the deceased and P.Ws. S and 7. officers of the company and P.W. 6, standing counsel of the company were all coming out of the office of an industrial tribunal after filing their written statements in a dispute raised by· the workers. The prosecution cas~ was that at the main gate of the tribunal's building the respondent suddenJy star- ted firing from a pistol and shot dead the deceased. As firing was going on, a telephonic message conveying the fact that gunshots were being fired was sent to the nearby police station. On receipt of the telephonic message the police arrived ;t the sp,t, seized the pistol and took the respondent and some of the witnes4'es to the police station where a formal FIR was registered. The Session.i Judge conv.icted the accused under s. 302 IPC ands. 25 (1) (a) of Indian Arms Act and sentenced him to life imprisonment and one Years' rigorous imprisonment respectively. On appeal the High Court reversed the. judgment of the Sessions Judge. The High Court observed that if P.W. 7 had given the telephonic message, as stated by D.W. 1, he would have men .. tioned the name ·or the assailant because he was a fu11-f1edged eye-witness but since his name had not been mentioned it was the strongest possible circum- stance to discredit the prosecution case. Hence this appeal. A11owing the appeal, HELD ; Normally this Court does not interfere against the judgment of E F G H B c D E F 0 B 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 1 s.c.R. ~he High ?curt pur~I! on. appreciatio'n of evidence, But this Court would I~terfere with the drc1s1on ot the High Court if there appear to be very special c1~cumstances Which have been ei:her overlooked or not considered by the High Court or the High Court does not appear to have examined the intrinsic merits of the evidence of the witnesses but has proceeded to acquit the accused on general grounds which are wholly untenable. [5B-C) A cryptic information on telephone has been held by this Court to be of no value at all, The mere fact that the information was the first in point of tjme does not by itself clothe it with the character of first information report. Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, [1971) I SCR 599, referred to. In the instant case the telephonic message was an extremely cryptic one and could not be regarded as a FIR in any sense of the tern1, The High Court has applied two different standards to assess the evi- dence of the prosecution and that of the defence. While the High Court accepts the uncorroborated evidence of D. W. 1 who is as much interested in the dispute as the deceased, if not inore, being Vice-President of the Union and also in possession of the brief case of the respondent, yet it disbelieves the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 7 mainly on the ground that they were highly interes· ted. (7H; SA-BJ The High Court completely lost sight of two important facts-(!) that P .Ws. 5 and 7 were high officers of the company and were not likely to depose falsely on a matter like this, and (2) that P.W. 6, who was the standing eounsel of the company and other labour cases for more than 3 decades, fully corroborates the evidence of P, Ws. 5 and 7. We have examined the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 7 with very great care and caution but we are un'able to find anY discrepancy or defect in their evidence so as to lead any court to reject the same. [BE-Fl The finding of the High Court that it is difficult 10 believe that after the respondent threw the pistol he continued to remain at the spot and did not make any attempt to escape is also most lnnrealistic. There is clear evjdence of P.Ws. 5, 6 and 7 that after the responcent threw down the pistol he was surrounded by the three witnesses so that he could not e~cape. The High Court has failed to consider this important aspect of the matter. Moreover~ if a perscn ~ommit
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