STATE OF U.P versus NAND KUMAR AGGARWAL AND ORS.
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STATE OF U.P v. NANDKUMARAGGARWALANDORS. NOVEMBER 19, 1997 [SUJATA V. MANOHAR AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.] Urban land (Ceiling & Regulations) Act, 1976-Ss. 2, 6 (I), 33 Claim for exemption from ceiling as being agricultural land-It is actual use of the A B land on the relevant date.. that would decide its status as agricultural or C otherwise-Though revenue records showed it as agricultural land and as per the master plan it was to be for agriculture, it was used for brick making on the date on which the Act came into force, and therefore cannot be exempted-It is the main use that will decide the actual nature of the land even if a portion is used for agricultural-land within an urban agglomeration will not be 'urban land' if used for agricultural purposes. D The question involved in this appeal by the State is, whether the lands in question which were actually used for brick making but entered in revenue records and stated purpose of which in the master plan was agriculture, could be exempted from ceiling under the Urban Land (Ceilings Regulations) Act. The Competent authority and the District Judge, on appeal, E had refused exemption from ceiling, but the High court, relying on the revenue records and the stated purpose in the Master plan, held that it was agricultural land and therefore. not subject to ceiling. Allowing the appeal, this Court HELD: 1. High Court was not correct in holding that the land was F being mainly used for the purpose of agriculture merely on the strength of the purpose in the master plan which is specified as agriculture (Krishi Bhumi) and that the land is entered in the revenue records. High court has wrongly applied Explanation B to clause (o) of section 2 of the Urban ceiling Act. Simply because land is entered in the revenue record would not mean G that it is being used mainly for the purpose of agriculture. Here the land is mainly usedJor the purpose of brick kiln business of the first respondent. It is not material if a small portion of the land was used for the purpose of agriculture as well. (235-D-F( 2. An affidavit was filed by the first respondent before the Secretary, H 229 230 SUPREME COUP-T REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. A Local Self Government, Lucknow for the purpose of seeking exclusion of the land in village Para from the ceiling 'operations'. This affidavit of the 1st respondent showed that the land in question was being used mainly for the purpose of brick kiln business. In the master plan the area in question is no doubt shown as agriculture. From the schedule mentioned in the definition B of urban agglomeration it could be seen that area in question falls within urban agglomeration as it is situated within the peripheral area of the Municipal Corporation of Lucknow (Lucknow Naga;- Mahapalika). The land in question will not be urban land though situated within the limits of an urban agglomoration, if it is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture. Operating of a Bhatta cannot certainly be an agriculture purpose. C 1231-G; 234-G-Hj 3. It is correct that the land in question is entered in the revenue record but at the same time the record shows that the land is being used for Bhatta. The foremost question is whether the land in question though agricultural was being mainly used for the purpose of agriculture on the D appointed day Seeing the definition and the affidavit of the 1st respondent dated August 13, 1976 the answer is obvious that land in question is not being used for the purpose of agriculture. 1235-BI 4. Agriculture under the explanation to clause (o) has a limited. meaning. It includes horticulture but does not include cultivation of every E type of vegetation or rearing of animals or birds. That apart, to hold that land is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture it is not enough even ifthe land is entered in revenue records before the appointed day used for the purpose of agriculture or even if so entered the master plan gives purpose of the land other than agriculture. In the present case though (B) and (C) to the F explanation are satisfied (A) is not, as the purpose to which the land, though agriculture and so entered in the revenue records, was being used for running of brick-kiln. 1235-C-DI CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7168 of 1996. From the Judgment and Order dated 20. IO. 89 of the High Court in W.P. G No. 1242of1986. G. K. Mathur, Arvind Kr. Shukla and Ashok K.
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