STATE OF U.P. versus COL. SUJAN SINGH AND ORS.

Citation: [1964] 7 S.C.R. 734 · Decided: 15-04-1964 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. SUBBA RAO · Disposal: Dismissed
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Judgment (excerpt)

1964 
April z,j 
734 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1964} 
STATE OF U.P. 
v. 
COL. SUJAN SINGH AND ORS. 
[K. SuBBA RAO, K .. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, 
JJ.] 
Criminal Trial-Sanction by Central Government-Proceed-
ing pending before special Judge-Accused asking for produc-
tion of document fr"m the Union Government-Privilege 
claimed by Government-Special Judge and High Coort in 
revision reiccting the claim of privilege~Order if a "fina.! order',. 
-Petition for grant of certificate-Maintainability-Petition for 
special !eave barred by !imitation-Petition for excusing delay 
on wrong legal advice-If a sufficient ground-Constituticn of 
India, Art. 134(1)(c)-Supreme Court Rules, 1959, 0.21. r. 1(1) . 
. The respondents were prosecuted in the court of the special 
Judge after obtaining the sanction of the Central Government,. 
for an offence under s. 6(l)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption 
Act. They put an objection that the sanctioning authority did 
not apply his mind properly when sanction was granted. One 
of the respondents asked the Court to summon the concerned 
record of the Home Department for, it would substantiate his 
assertion that the concerned officer did not apply his mind 
earliar in according sanction for his prosecution. The Secretary 
Ministry of Home Affairs, claimed privilege. The Special Judge 
and the High Court in revision rejected the claim of privilege 
of the Union Government. The appellant then filed a petition 
in the High Court for grant of a certificate. The High Court 
held that the order sought to be appealed against was an inter-
locutory one and, therefore, the petition ·nas not maintainable 
under Art. 134(l)(c) of the Constitution. Against the order of the 
High Court in revision the appell'ant filed a petition for special 
leave to appeal stating that he apolied for a certificate to the 
High Court but it was refused. The appellant did not bring to-
the notice of this Court that the petition for special leave was 
out of time. The Registry could not point out the defect as in the 
petition it was stated that the application under Art. 134(1)(c) 
was dismissed by the High Court without indicating on what 
ground it did and this Court assumed that it was in time and 
granted special leave. However after obtaining the perrrJission 
of this Court the ap~dlant filed a petition for excusing the delay 
on the ground that the Law Officer, who was at the relevant 
time in charge of the matter in the High Court, advised the 
Government that the order under appeal was a final order and 
that an application should be filed under Art. 134(1)(c) of the 
Constitution and that the appellant acted bonafide. The appel-
lant contended 0) that the o"der of the High Court in the crimi-
nal revision was a final order within the meaning of Art. 134 
(lJ(c) of the Constitution and (2) that the rule 1(1) of 0. XX! 
of the Supreme Court Rules does not say in express terms that 
the order of refusal to give a certificate must be on an annli-
cation which is maintainable and, therefore, if in fact the High 
Court refused to give a certificate. whether on merits or on the 
ground that it was not maintainable, the party could take 
advantage of the said rnle. 
Hdd (per K. Subba Rao and K. C. Das Guota, JJ): (i) The 
order under appeal was not a final order \\,ithin the meaning 
of Art. 134(1) of the Constitution. It did not purport to decide 
7 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS. 
735 
1964 
State of U.P. 
v. 
the rights of the parties. namely. the State U.P. and the accused. 
Assuming that it decided some right of the Union Government. 
the Union Government was neither a party to the criminal 
proceedings nor was it a party either before the High Court 
.or before this Court. The indirect effect of the order of a third 
party to the proceedings, who did not seek to question that 
order, did not deprive the order of dts interlocutory character. 
Col. Su.jan Singh 
and··o:lwr 
Seth Premchand Satramdas v. State of Bihar f1950] S.C.R. 
799, relied on. 
(ii) Rule 1(1) of 0. XXI presupposes that the application 
for the certificate is maintainable and the Court refuses to give 
it on the ground that the condition laid down in Art. 134(1) of 
the Constitution have not been complied with. On a reasonable 
dnterpretation of the rule, it could only mean that the refusal 
of the certificate must be in an application maintainable under 
the said Article. 
(iii) The order ex facie was an interlocutory order and so 
far as th
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