STATE OF U.P. & ANOTHER versus MALIK ZARID KHALID

Citation: [1988] 1 S.C.R. 948 · Decided: 11-11-1987 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: RANGANATH MISRA · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
STATE OF U.P. & ANOTHER 
v. 
MALIK ZARID KHALID 
NOVEMBER 11, 1987 
B 
[RANGANATH MISRA ANDS. RANGANATHAN, JJ.) 
Uttar Pradesh Public Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and 
Eviction) Act, 1972: Sections 2(1)(a) and 21-Buildings taken on lease 
by Government-Possession for owners occupation-Remedy--
Whether only by way of suit. After May 18, 1983-Change in position-
C Effect of amendments by Ordinances and U.P. Act No. 17 of 1985-
Explained. 
D 
E 
Statutory Construction. When Courts entitled to read down the 
plain language of a statutory provision. 
The appellant-State of Uttar Pradesh, took on lease the premises 
belonging to the respondent for the purpose of running a Training_ 
Centre. The respondent-landlord gave a notice of termination of the 
tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and filed a 
suit for recovery of possession. 
The appellant claimed that the suit was not maintainable and that 
the respondent's remedy, if any, was only to seek eviction in the 
circumstances and in the manner outlined in the Uttar Pradesh Build-
ings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The respon-
F dent sought to overcome this hurdle by contending that the premises in 
question was not one of the classes of 'building' covered by the aforesaid 
Rent Act, and in support thereof relied on the exclusion clause incorpo-
rated in Section 2(l)(a) of the Rent Act. 
The appellant contended, successfully before the Additional 
G District Judge, but unsuccessfully before the trial court and the High 
Court, that the premises in question was not a 'public building' with the 
meaning of section 3(0) read with section 2(1)(a) of the Rent Act, as 
amended from July 5, 1976 and hence, the respondent's remedy for 
eviction of the appellant was not by way of suit in a Civil Court. 
H 
Dismissing the Appeal to this Court, 
948 
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STATE OF U.P . . v MALIK ZARID 
949 
HELD: 1. The building in question is one taken on lease by the 
A 
State Government and so it falls squarely within the definition of 
'public building' in Section 3(0) of the. Act. It is, therefore, exempt 
from the application of the Act by reasons of s. 2(1) as it stood at 
the relevant time. It would follow, therefore, that the respondent's 
remedy to recover possession lay under the general law and had to be 
enforced by a suit for recovery of possession which is exactly what he 
B 
has done. [955B) 
2. Sub-sections (1), (IA) and (8) ofs. 21 have to be read together. 
Though s. 2(l)(a) excluded 'public buildings' which has to interpreted to 
include buildings in which the Government is only a tenant--s.2l(A) 
incorporates an exception to this exclusion. "Notwithstanding anything 
C 
contained in s. 2", it permits an application for eviction being moved 
under section 2l(l)(a) of the Act by a landlord against any tenant but in 
the limited circumstances set out in that sub-section viz. that the land-
lord has been in occupation of a public building but had to vacate it as 
he had ceased to be in the employment of the Government, Local 
Authority or Corporation. [958C-D I 
D 
3. The landlord of a building in which the Government is a tenant 
could have moved an application under s. 21(1) read with s. 21(1A). 
This is what is prohibited by s. 21(8) absolutely in view of clauses (ii) 
and (iv) of Explanation 1 to sub-section (1) being non-existent. S. 21(8) 
makes it clear that while a landlord who is compelled to vacate a public 
E 
building occupied by him due to cessation of his employment can pro-
ceed under the Act to evict any tenant occupying his property so that he 
may use his own property for his residential purposes, he will not be 
able to do so where his tenant is the Government, a local authority or a 
public Corporation. Thus read, s. 21(8) does not become otiose or 
redundant by accepting the wider interpretation ofs. 3(0). [958D-F) 
F 
4(i) The interpretation placed by the Full Bench of the High 
Court on s. 3(0) in Punjab National Bank v. Suganchand, [1985) l ARC 
214 equates the position under the statute after the amendment of 1976 
to the position both as it stood prior to the 1976 amendment and also as 
it stood after the 1983 Ordinance. Such an approach fails to give any 
G 
effect at all to the change in language deliberately introduced by the 
1976 amendment. [956H; 957A) 
(ii) Prior to the amendment, only buildings of which the Govern-
ment was owner or landlord were excluded from the Act. 

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