STATE OF TAMIL NADU versus TYL. JEEVANLAL LTD.

Citation: [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 619 · Decided: 13-08-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.P. BHARUCHA · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

STATE OF TAMIL NADU 
v. 
TYL. JEEVANLAL LTD. 
AUGUST 13, 1996 
[S.P. BHARUCHA AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.] 
Sales Tax: 
Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959: 
Sections 31(3), 32(3), 34(2)(a) and 36(6)-Suo motu revisiollal jwis-
dictioll of the Board of Revellui-Scope of-Held, the Bomd callllOt exercise 
its revisiollal jurisdictioll ill respect of that pa1t of the impuglled order which 
was agaillst the Revellue. 
A 
B 
c 
Sectiolls 36(2)(b), 36(3)(a)(i), 36(3)-Revisional power of the Board D 
of Re>enue-Appellate order-Partly ill favour alld partly against the asses-
se~hallenged before the Appellate Tlibunaf--The bar of Sectioll 34(2)(b) 
agaillst the revisiollal powers of the Board of Revenue will operate in its full 
swillg-The order pendillg scmtiny before the Appellate Tribunal will go out 
of the ken of the revisiollal jurisdictioll collferred on the Board of Revenue 
under S ectioll 34. 
The question raised in this appeal was whether the Board of Revenue 
functioning under the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Act could revise, under its 
szw motu revisional jurisdiction, that part of the order which was against 
the Revenue. The High Court had taken the view that once the Assessee 
had carried the matter in appeal being aggrieved by that part of the order 
of the AAC which was against him, the entire order came within the 
purview of the Appellate Tribunal and under these circumstances the 
Board of Revenue would have no jurisdiction to exercise suo niotu 
revisional jurisdiction against the remaining part of the order. 
Dismissing this Appeal, this Court 
HELD : 1.1. Section 34 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 
1959 shows that the Board of Revenue will have· no jurisdiction to touch 
E 
F 
G 
any order of subordinate authority passed under Section 31(3Y or 32(3) in 
exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 34(2)(a) for the tern- H 
619 
620 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 
A porary period till the time for appeal against such orders is not over and 
even its jurisdiction will be permanently barred under Section 34(2)(b) 
on<e appeal or revision against such order of the subordinate authority is 
carried for scrutiny in appeal before the Tribunal or in revision before the 
High Court. Section 34(2) (a) does not refer to any part of the order which 
B 
might only be against the assessee. It refers to the order as a whole. Now 
the order of the subordinate authority, namely the Appellate Assistant 
Collector, can wholly be in favour of the assessee or can be partly in favour 
of the Revenue. In the first case there will be no occasion for such an order 
to be carried in appeal or revision either before the Tribunal or before the 
High Court by the assessee. In such a case the Board of Revenue will have 
C ample jurisdiction to exercise its suo ntotu revisional powers in scrutinis- · 
ing the correctness of the orders concerned of the subordinate authorities 
which are passed against the Revenue and the bar of Section 34(2)(b) 
would not get attracted. But in the latter two cases such order of the 
Appellate Assistant Collector can certainly be made a subject-matter of 
D grievance by the assessee before the Appellate Tribunal or even before the 
High Court in revision. So far as second type of order is concerned, as is 
wholly against the assessee, there will be no occasion for the Board to 
exercise its suo ntotu revisional powers against such an order, es11ecially 
when the assessee prefers to challenge it in appeal before the Tribunal. But 
E 
F 
G 
a possibility of the Board and tile Tribunal being simultaneously ap-
proached by the Revenue and the assessee would arise if at all the order 
of the appellant authority is partly in favour of and partly against the 
assessee. However, even in such a case the fact that such order is partly 
against the assessee and partly in his favour will make no difference as the 
order as a whole would be available for scrutiny before the Tribunal or 
before the High Court in revision. Consequently, the bar of jurisdiction 
under Section 34(2)(b) would operate against the Board of Revenue qua 
such an order. (625-G; 626-A-H; 627-A-B] 
1.2. The same conclusion as aforesaid flows from the provisions of 
Section 36 as wel.. Section 36(3)(a)(i) clearly indicates that in an appeal 
taken out by the assessee before the Tribunal, the Tribunal can even 
enhance the assessment or penalty or both. It is obvious that the assessee 
who is an appellant would not urge f

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