STATE OF TAMIL NADU versus T.V. VENUGOPALAN

Citation: [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 411 · Decided: 03-08-1994 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY, N. VENKATACHALA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

STATE OF TAMIL NADU 
v. 
T.V. VENUGOPALAN 
AUGUST 3, 1994 
[K. RAMASWAMY AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.] 
Service Law-Correctio11 of date of birth. 
Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Services Rules 1961 : Rules 49 and 
49A-Application for correction of the date of birth to be made within 5 years 
from the date when the mies had come into force i.e. 1961-11ie employee 
looses his nght to make an applican·on for the inordinate delay in making the 
applicatiorr-11ie delay itself is a ground for rejecting the application for 
correction of date of birth. 
A 
B 
c 
The respondent entered into service of the State Government in 1952. D 
His date of birth was recorded as August 15, 1933 according to the proce-
dure in vogue at that time namely as per the declaration of father. The 
respondent was due to retire on August 31, 1991. On August 14, 1990 he 
made a representation stating that his father had inadvertently stated his 
date of birth as August 15, 1933. His request for correction Wlls rejected by 
the GovernmenL He filed an application in the Administrative Tribunal E 
which allowed his application and directed the extension of respondent's 
service by 2 years. The State P.referred the present appeal. 
It was contended for the respondent that the Tribunal bad ap-
preciated the evidence and bad found the reasons given for rejection as 
unsound. It was further contended that the limitation of 5 years were 
prescribed in 1961 and as be bad entered the service earlier, it was not 
applicable in his case. 
Allowing the appeal the, Supreme Court 
F 
HELD : 1. Rule 49 of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Services G 
Rules 1961 is to be harmoniously interpreted. The application for correc-
tion of date of birth of an inservlce employee should be made within live 
years from the date when the Rules had come into force, i.e. 1961. If no 
application is made, after expiry of five years, the government employee 
loses his right to make an application for correction of his date of birth. It H 
411 
412 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 
A 
is seen that the respondent entered into the service on January 12, 1952, 
and only when he was due for superannuation at the age of 58 years on 
August 31, 1991, he made the application exactly one year before his super-
annuation. The government rejected his claim before he attained the age of 
superannuation on August 30, 1991. When questioned, the Tribunal, for 
B 
incorrect reasons, ~et aside the order and remitted the matter for recon· 
sideration. The goverrament considered various facts and circumstances in 
the G.O. Ms. No. 271 and rejected the claim on March 31, 1993. [417-C, DJ 
2.1 The evidence is not unimpeachable or irrefutable. The Tribunal 
in its judicial review is not justified in trenching into the field of apprecia-
C lion of evidence and circumstances in its evaluation to reach a conclusion 
on merits as it is not a court of appeal. This Court has, repeatedly, been 
holding that the inordinate delay in making the application is itself a 
ground for rejecting the correction of date of birth. The government 
servant having declared that his date of birth as entered in the service 
register to be correct, would not be permitted at the fag-end of his service 
D career to raise a dispute as regards the correctness of the entries in the 
service register. It is common phenomena that just before superannuation, 
an application would be made to the Tribunal or Court just to gain time 
to continue in service and the Tribunal or Courts are unfortunately unduly 
liberal in entertaining and allowing the government employees or public 
E employees to remain in office, which is ading an impetus to resort tt• .. the 
fabrication of the record and place reliance thereon and seek the authority 
to correct it. When rejected, on grounds of technicalities, question them 
and remain in office till the period claimed for, gets expired. This case is 
one such stark instance. [ 417-E to H, 418-A) 
F 
2.2. The Tribunal has grossly erred in showing over- indulgence iri 
granting the reliefs even trenching beyond its powers of allowing the 
respondent to remain in office for two years after his date of superannua-
tion even as per his own case and given all conceivable directions beneficial 
to the employee. It is, therefore, a case of the grossest error of law 
G committed by the Tribunal which cannot be countenanced and cannot be 
sustained on any ground. [418-B) 
Union of India v. Hamam Sin

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