STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ORS. versus SANJEETHA TRADING CO. AND ORS.

Citation: [1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 840 · Decided: 24-09-1992 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. SAWANT · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ORS. 
v. 
SANJEETHA TRADING CO. AND ORS. 
SEPTEMBER 24, 1992 . 
[P.B. SAWANT AND N.P. SINGH, JJ.) 
Tamil Nadu Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning Act, 
1949/Tamil Nadu Timber (Movement Control) Order, 1982: 
Section 3/Clause 3-Timber declared as an essential articl&-Amend· 
ment of clause by Notification dated 22nd September, 1983, prohibiting 
movement and transport of timber outside State-Constitutional validity of. 
Constitution of India, 1950: 
Articles 19(1)(g), 301 and 304(b)-fnter-State trade and com-
merc&-Timber declared as essential article-Prohibition on movement and 
transport of timber outside the 'State'--Validity of-Whether ban regulatory in 
nature. 
By notification dated 2nd November, 1982, issued by the appellant· 
E 
State, in exercise of the power conferred by clause (a) of Section 2 of the 
Tamil Nadn Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning Act, 1949, tlm· 
her was declared to be an essential article. By another notification of the 
same date the Tamil Nadu Timber (Movement Control) Order, 1982 came 
into force. Under Clause 3 of the Movement Control Order no person was 
F 
entitled to transport timber from any place within the State of Tamil Nadu 
to any place outside the State, except under and in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of a permit issued under the Tamil Nudu Timber 
Transit Rules, 1968. 
By notification dated 22nd September, 1983, the expressioms 'except 
G under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a permit issued 
under the Tamil Nadu Timber Rules, 1968' in Clause 3 of the Order were 
omitted. The effect of the amendment was that there was a complete ban 
on the movement of the timber from the State of Tamil Nadu to any place 
outside the State. 
H 
The constitutionality of the amendment was questioned by the 
840 
STATEOFT.N. v.SANJEETHATRADINGCO. 
841 
respondents before the High Court contending that total ban on the A 
movement of the timber from the appellant-State to any other State was 
not only violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitntion but also of Artifle 
301 of the Constitution, which ensured every citizen, subject to the 
provisions of Part XIII of the Constitution, free trade, Commerce and 
intercourse throughout the territory of India. 
The High Court held that the amendment in question was violative 
of Articles 19(1) (g) and 301 of the Constitution and as such unconstltu, 
tlonal and invalid. 
B 
In the appeal before this Court on behalf of the appellant-State it C 
was submitted that as the act had been framed to provide for powers to 
control the supply, distribution, transport and prices of essential articles 
and trade and commerce therein, after Issuance of notification dated 2nd 
November, 1982, by the State Government, declaring timber to be an 
essential article, it was open to the State Government to prollibit the 
movement or transport of timber outside the State taking Into considera- D 
lion Qie Interest of people of the State, and that although a complete ban 
had been imposed on the movement and transport of a timber, the said 
ban should not be deemed to be a restriction because it amounted only to 
regulation of trade in timber. 
Allowing the appeals, this Court, 
HELD : 1.1. The framers of the Constitution while saying under 
Article 301 of the Constitution that trade, commerce and Intercourse 
throughout the territory of India should be free were quite conscious of 
E 
the fact that public Interest may require such freedom to be curbed or F 
curtailed. That is '!hY under Article 302 or the Constitution, Parliament 
was empowered to Impose such restrictions on the freedom of trade, 
commerce or Intercourse between one State and another or within any part 
' 
of the territory of India as may be required in the public Interest by law. 
However, the expression 'reasonable' did not precede the word G 
'restrictions'. Same thing was provided so far as State Legislatures were 
concerned under Article 304(b), vesting them with power to Impose "sucb 
reasonable restrictions' on freedom or trade, commerce or intercourse 
with or within that State as may be required in the ·public interest by law. 
In Article 304(b) the expression 'reasonable' precedes 'restrictions' and r. 
further check has been provided by saying in the proviso to the said article H 
842 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP.1 S.C.R. 
A that no bill or amendment for the purpose of clause (b) should be intro· 
du

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