STATE OF RAJASTHAN versus BANWARI LAL AND ANOTHER
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A B C D E F G H 613 [2022] 5 S.C.R. 613 613 STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. BANWARI LAL AND ANOTHER (Criminal Appeal No. 579 of 2022) APRIL 08, 2022 [M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.] Appeal by State: Conviction of accused-B by the trial Court for the offence u/s.307 IPC for having caused serious injuries on the vital part of the body of the victim/injured β Trial Court sentenced accused-B to undergo three yearsβ rigorous imprisonment β In an appeal before the High Court, the accused did not challenge the conviction, but only prayed the Court to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone by him by submitting that occurrence took place about 26 years ago; that they were facing trial since then; and when the occurrence took place, they were young and now they are aged persons β High Court, without any detailed analysis of the facts of the case, nature of injuries caused, weapon used, simply reduced the sentence to the period already undergone (44 days) β Held: The manner in which the High Court dealt with the appeal and has reduced the sentence, without adverting to the relevant facts and without considering the gravity and nature of offence, is unsustainable β High Court has dealt with the appeal in a most casual and cavalier manner β The judgment and order passed by the High Court reducing the sentence is nothing but an instance of travesty of justice and against all the principles of law on imposing appropriate punishment/suitable punishment β As per s.307 IPC, whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life or to such punishment as mentioned in s.307 IPC β In the instant case, accused-B could have been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and/or at least up to ten years β Trial court sentenced him to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment β Therefore, as such, trial court already took a very lenient view while imposing the sentence of A B C D E F G H 614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R. only three yearsβ rigorous imprisonment β Therefore, High Court ought not to have interfered with the same β Merely because a long period lapsed by the time the appeal is decided cannot be a ground to award the punishment which is disproportionate and inadequate β High Court did not at all advert to the relevant factors while imposing appropriate/suitable punishment/sentence β The manner in which the High Court has dealt with and disposed of the appeal is highly deprecated β Penal Code, 1860 β s.307 β Judicial deprecation. Appeal: Appeal preferred by the State against order of probation passed in favour of accused-M β Trial court granted benefit of probation to accused-M, against which the State did not prefer any appeal before the High Court and it was the accused who preferred appeal, which came to be dismissed β State ought not to have preferred the instant appeal against the accused-M, when his appeal before the High Court was dismissed and the conviction was confirmed β If the State was aggrieved against granting the benefit of probation, in that case, in the first instance, the State ought to have preferred an appeal before the High Court. Appeal: Delay on part of State in filing appeal β Condonation of β Plea by accused that they have resettled in their lives and have not indulged in any criminal activity and therefore, substantial delay on part of State in filing appeal should not be condoned β Held: Merely on the technical ground of delay and merely on the ground that the accused have resettled in their lives and their conduct has since been satisfactory and they have not indulged in any criminal activity, is no ground not to condone the delay and not to consider the appeal on merits β The delay of 1880 days in preferring appeal is condoned. Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.The approach of the High Court is most cavalier. Therefore, the order of the High Court merits interference by this Court. Merely on the technical ground of delay and merely on the ground that after the impugned judgment and order, which is unsustainable, the accused have resettled in their lives and their conduct has since been satisfactory and they have not indulged in any criminal acti
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