STATE OF PUNJAB versus SRI HARDYAL

Citation: [1985] 3 S.C.R. 649 · Decided: 10-04-1985 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: O. CHINNAPPA REDDY · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

rr 
~ 
... 
649 
' 
... 
STATE OF PUNJAB 
v. 
' 
" 
SRI HARDYAL 
'•:1 
April 10, 1985 
., 
[0.CHINNAPPA REDDY AND R.B. MISRA, JJ] 
Arbitration Act 1940, section! 3 and 28 (I) and (2) and clause 3 of the First 
Schedule-Written agreement-:-Containlng arbitration clause-No period, fixed 
for giving award-Statutory period-Applicability of-Parties participating in the· 
proceedin¥s afte_r the expiry of pre~cribed period-Whether amounts to_ ~xten~ion of 
time. for -making award-Extension of time for making award-{urisdicllon of . 
arbitrator-Court's exercise of discretion in 
extension OJ time-Doctrine of ' 
waiver and estoppel whether apl!licable. 
·" By a written agreement,· the reFpondent agr'eed to construct bridges and 
culverts for State Govl!rnment. The agreement contained an arbitration clause, 
the Arbitrator being the Superintcndiog Eogineer. However, no period was 
fixed for giving the award and• therefore-, :the statutory period of .four months 
for giving the award prescribed in clause 3 of the First Schedule to the Arbitra-
tion Act was applicable. 
' 
" 
A dispute arose between the parties, The respondent sent a notice to the 
Arbitrator requestiag him to accept his claim an~ give his award •. The respon-
dent c:airhCd compensation on two counts, namely, (1) that the Sub-Divisional 
Officer got certain bridges demolished which had been construed strictly in-, 
terms of the agreemi!nt, and (2) that,,the _ re"pondent bad also been.directed io 
stop the work. 
The Arbitrator g~vC his award _against the respondent after the expiry of 
the prescribed period, the respondent having participated perio"d,in the proceed-
ings before the Arbitrator even after the expirJ of the statutory period. The 
respOndent cha11enged ihe ·award but the trial Court overruled the objec'tiori and 
upheld the a·ward. 
· 
I 
•, 
r' 
_t, , 
On appeal to the Hi~h Court, a Single Judge referred .two points for 
decision l?Y a Division Bench, (l}Whethei: . the aWafd given after the expiry of 
the.pres~ribed period without extension of. time by the·Cowrt was iOvalid ? and. 
A 
B 
c 
) 
El 
I 
F 
(2) W. hether the pariicip~tion ·il'l the &rbitrafion -proce·edings eveQ ·after the 
H '· 
,· 
650 
SUPREME COURTS REPORTS 
(1982] 3 s.c.a. 
,, 
A 
expiry of the period of limitation prescribed would by necessary implication 
amount to extending the time under s. 28 of the Arbitration Act by the 
Court 7 
• 
B 
c 
The Division Bench· allowed the objection of the respondent regarding 
delay in giving the award, holding that a party to an arbitration agreement is: 
not (estopped from challenging the "award on the ground of delay merely be-
cause it had participated in the arbitration proce~dings even after the expiry 
of the prescribed period without any demur, that mere dismissal of the objection 
regarding delay in the award does not amount an ex.tension of time by the 
Court under s. 28 (I) of the Arbitration Act, and that time can be extended by 
the Court by the exercise of sound judicial discretion. The appeal wasa Uow~d 
and the case remanded to the trial Court for ·deciding whether it f/BS a fit case 
for condoning the delay in giving the award by the Arbitrator. 
Allowing the Appeal of the State in part, 
• 
. . 
HELD : I. The 
0 provisions of ss. 3 and 28 (I) and (2) and clause 3 of 
D 
First Schedule to the Act indicate that it is open to_ the parties to ·an arbitration 
agreerrient to fix: the time Within which the Arbitrator must give his award, but ii 
has to be so stated in the agreement itself. If per chance no ·timC has been- speci..: 
fled by the parties in the arbitration agreement. then by virtue of operatiOn of 
s.3 with read clause 3 of the First .Sc edule the award must be given within four 
months of the arbitrator entering on the r~ference or after having been called 
upon to act by notice in writing from any party to the arbitr11tion agreement or,
1 
• 
E 
within such extended time as the Court may allow. [654A-B] 
F 
G1 
H, 
2. Sub-section (I) of s.28 is very wide and confers full discretion on the 
Court to enlarge time for the award at any time, which should, however, be 
exercised' judiciously. Sub-section (2) of s. 28 makei: it evident that the Court 
alone has the power to extend time. it further provides that a clause in the . 
arbitration agreement giving the Arbitrator power to enlarge time shall be void 
and of no clfect except when all the parties corisent to such enlargement. It is 
not open to Arbitrators ~at the

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.