STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS. ETC. ETC. versus JOGINDER SINGH AND ORS. ETC. ETC.
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. ..( STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS. ETC. ETC. v. JOGINDER SINGH AND ORS. ETC. ETC. MARCH 23, 1990 A [A.M. AHMADI AND M. FATHIMA BEEVI, JJ.) B Manual for the Superintendence and Management of Jails in Punjab: Paragraphs 516-B and 631-Whether statutory in character- Interpretation of-Remission of sentence-Grant of-Powers and fetters. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Sections 432, 433 and 433A- Sentence-Suspension, remission and commutation-Grant of- Punjab Jail Manual-Paragraphs 5/6B and 631-lnterpretation of. c Paragraph 516-B of the Manual for the Superintendence and Management of Jails in Punjab provides for premature release of pri- D soners. The State Government had issued instructions in 1971 modify- ing the executive instructions in paragraph 516B, to the effect that a convict must have undergone 81h years of substantive sentent;e before his case could be submitted to the Government for consideration. Again there was another executive instruction in 1976 which provided that cases of convicts who were sentenced to death and whose sentences were E subsequently commuted to life imprisonment would not be submitted to the State Government for consideration unless the convict has under- gone atleast 14 years of substantive imprisonment. Paragraph 631 of the said Manual relates to remission of sen- tences. The note below paragraph 631 reproduces the gist of paragraph F 516-B. Going by the preface of the Manual, paragraph 631 has statutory force whereas paragraph 516B being in the nature of executive instruc- tion has no statutory for~e. The respondents filed Criminal Writ Petitions before the High Court praying for their premature release on the basis that the note under paragraph 631 has statutory force, the executive instructions issued in 1971 and 1976 have to be ignored and that the Jail Superinten- dent was bound to submit their cases to the Government for premature G release. H 147 A B c 148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS l 1990] 2 S.C.R. The High Court allowed the claim of the respondents and held that the executive instructions issued in 1971 and 1976 being in conflict with the statutory note must give way to the latter. These appeals, by special leave, preferred by the State Govern- ment challenge the High Court's decision on the ground that the source of paragraphs 516 and the note at the foot of paragraph 631 being the same, viz., resolution dated 6th September, 1905, it cannot be con- cluded that the note being an integral part of the statutory rule incorporated in paragraph 63 l must receive the same character and in case of conflict between the two, the note which is statutory in character most prevail. Allowing the appeals, this Court, HELD: I. Remissions by way of reward or otherwise cannot cut down the sentence awarded by the Court except under Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code or in exercise of constitutional power o under Article 72/161 of the Constitution. Remission cannot detract from the quantum and qualitv of the judicial sentence except to the extent permitted by Section 432 of the Code, subject of course to Section 433A, or where the clemency power under the Constitution is invoked. The power under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution is absolute and cannot be fettered by any statutory provision such as Sections 432, 433 E and 433A of the Code. This power cannot be altered, modified or interfered with in any manner whatsoever by any statutory provisions or Prison Rules. ( 153H; 154A-C] 2. Remission schemes are introduced to ensure prison discipline and good behaviour and not to upset sentences. If the sentence is of -f F imprisonment for life, ordinarily the convict has to pass the remainder of his life in prison but remissions and commutations are granted in exercise of power under Sections 432 and 433 Cr.P.C., carving out an exception in the category of those convicts who have already enjoyed the generosity of executive power on the commutation of death sentence to one of life imprisonment. Even in such cases Section 433A of the Code G or the executive instruction of 1976 does not insist that the convict pass the remainder of his life in prison but merely insists that he shall have served time for atleast 14 years. In the case of other 'lifers' the insis- tence under the 1971 amendment is that he should have a period of }. , atleast 8- i / 2 years of incarceration before release. The i 976 amendment was possibly in
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