LexSTATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR. versus KHAN CHAND
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768 STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR. v. KHAN CHAND December 17, 1973. [A. N. RAY, C.J., H. R. KHANNA, K. K. MATHEW, A. ALAGIRISWAMI AND P. N. BHAGW~TI, JJ.] Constitution of India, 1950, A.rt. 14-11 s. 2 of the East . Pun/ab Movable Property (Req14/sltlonlng) A.ct, (15 of 1941) Is violative of A.rt. 14. A B Tho truck of the respondent w.,. requisitioned under s. 2 of tho Eaat Punjab Movable Property (R<quisitioning) Act, 1947 for famino relief work. 1be section provides that the State Government, if it considers it necessa'1 or expedient so to do, may requisition any movable_ ·property •••••• provided that no property used for the purpose of religious worship and. no aircraft or any thing connected C with aircraft, shall be requisitioned. On the queation of the constitutional validity of the section HELD: (Per A. N. Ray, C.J., H. R. Khanna, A. Alagiriswami and P. N. Bhagwati, JJ. : ) The Act confers arbitrary powers for requisitioning of movable property upon the authorities udner the Act and . no guidelines whatsoever have been prescribed for the exercise of the powers. The provision therefore falls within the mischief which Art. 14 of the Constitution 1s designed to prevent and D hence is invalid. In view of the complex nature of the problems a modem State bas to face, it is but inevitable that matters of detail should be left to thr authorities acting under an enactment. Discretion has therefore to be given to the authorities con- cerned for the exercise of powers vested in them under an enactment. Such vesting does not by itself entail· contravention of Art. 14. What is objectionable is the conferment of arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion without any guidelines for the exercise of that discretion. The enactment must therefore prescribe the guidelines so that, within the framework of those -guidelines the authorities can exercise their discretion. But discretion which absolute and uncontrolled dege- nerates into arbitrariness. If a Legislature bestows such untrammelled discretion on authorities, it abdicates its essential function, for, such discretion is bound to result in discrifnination which is a negation of the ideal of equalty enshrined in Art. 14. A statute need not itself make any classification of the persons or things for tho purpose of applying its provisions, but may leave it to the Government to select and classify. In determining the validity of such a statute, the Court will not strike it down, n1erely because no classification appears on its face or because discretion is given to Government to make the classification. The Court will examine and ascertain if the statute has laid down any principle or policy for the guidance of the Government in the matter of classification: and it is only if the statute does not lay down any such principle or policy that the Court will strike down the sta'tute on the ground that it provides for the delegation of arbi- trary and uncontrolled power to the Government which may result in discrimina- tion. [774HJ (1) In the present case, the Act ·confers uncontrolled power on the State Government or the officers authorised by it to requisition any movable property except those excluded. No guidelines have been laid down in the Act reaarding the object or the purpose for.which the State Government or its officers may C<?n- sider it necessary or expedient to requisition. The Act does not even require that the authority requisitioning the movable property should specify the purpose in the order of rcQuisition. [77301 (2) 'There is no provision in the Act that the power of requisitionin, ran be exercised only for a public purpose or i~ an emerp,ncv or in. some special con- tingency. To read the words 'for a public purpese tn the section, when the words are not there, would amount to judicial legislation. [773Hl E G H r PUNJAB V. KHAN CHAND. 769 A (3) It is open under the Act, for an authorised officer to requisition any n1ovable property for any purpose. It is no answer to say that 8.n officer would not do so when there is 110thing in the Act which makes it impermissible for him to requisition any movable property for any purpose whatsoever. [774A-B] B c 0 F G H ( 4) The power under the Act can be exercised not only by the State Govern· ment but by any of its officers to whom it may be delegated by the State Gcvcrn- n1ent. The Act does not specify that the delegate should not be an officer belo\v a
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