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STATE OF ORISSA THROUGH ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, HOME DEPTT. versus BIMAL KUMAR MOHANTY

Citation: [1994] 2 S.C.R. 51 · Decided: 21-02-1994 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY, B.L. HANSARIA

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Judgment (excerpt)

52 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1994) 2 S.C.R. 
A Court contending that in view of the serious allegations against the respon-
dent the appointing authority WH justified in suspendin3 him pending 
contemplated disciplinary proceedings as well as investigation as con· 
templated by Rule 12 of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control 
and Appeal) Rules, 1962 and the Tribunal was not justified In interfering 
B with the orders. 
c 
On behalf of the respondent it was contended that the Tribunal bad 
discretionary power to suspend the suspension orders and this Court, 
while exercising Its power under Article 136, should not Interdict the 
discretionary power exercised by the Tribunal. 
Allowing the appeals and setting aside the orders of the Tribunal, 
this Court 
HELD: 1. True, normally, this Court would not Interdict the exercise 
of the power to pass interim orders by the Courts or Tribunals, obviously, 
D with the expectation that they exercise the discretionary power with cir· 
,_ 
cumspectlon after weighing pros and cons to subserve the ultimate result 
of the pending adjudication. But In the instant case, the Tribunal appears 
to have proceeded In baste in passing the impugned orders even before the 
Ink Is dried on the orders passed by the appointing authority. Since serious 
E allegations of misconduct have been alleged agabtst the respondent the 
Tribunal was quite unjustified In lnterferring with the orders of suspen-
sion of the respondent pending enquiry. Therefore, it is a lit case for 
interference by this Court. [56-G, 61-B-D] 
2. Suspension is not a punishment but only one of forbidding or 
F 
disabling an employee to discharge the duties of office or post held by him. 
In other words, it Is to refrain him to avail further opportunity to per· 
petrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the 
members of service that dereliction of duty would pay(rults and the offend· 
Ing employee could get away even pending enquiry without any impediment 
G or to prevent an opportunity to the delinquent officer to scuttle the enquiry 
or Investigation or to win over the witnesses or the delinquent having bad 
the opportunity In office to Impede the progress of the investigation or 
enquiry etc. [60-E-F]. 
3. Normally when an appointing authority or the disciplinary 
H authority seeks to suspend an employee pending enquiry or contemplated 
' , 
STATE v. B.K. MOHANTY [K. RAMASWAMY,J.) 
53 
Inquiry or pending investigation into grave charges of misconduct or A 
defalcation of funds or serious acts of omission and commission, the order 
of suspension would be passed after taking into consideration the gravity 
of the misconduct scught to be inquired into or investigated and the nature 
of the evidence placed before the appointing authority and on application 
of the mind by disciplinary authority. Appointing authority or disciplinary B 
authority should consider the above aspects and decide whether it is 
expedient to keep an employee under suspension pending aforesaid action. 
The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the loves· 
ligation or enquiry. The authority also should keep in mind public interest 
of the impact of the delinquent's continuance in office while facing 
departmental enquiry or trial of a criminal charge. It .would not be as an C 
administrative routine or an automatic order to suspend an employee. It 
should be on consideration of the gravity of the alleged misconduct or the 
nature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. The Court 
of the Tribunal must cousider each (!1!Se on its own facts and no general 
law could be laid down in that behalr. [60·C·E, 60-H, 61-A] 
R.P. Kapur v. Union of India, [1964] 5 S.C.R. 431; Balvantray Ratilal 
Patel v. State of Maharashtra, [1968) 2 S.C.R. 577; V.P. Grindronfy,. v. State 
of M.P., [1970) 3 S.C.R. 448; Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs 
D· 
& Ors. v. Tarak Nath Ghosh, [1971) 3 S.C.R. 715 and U.P. Rajya Krishi 
Utpadan Mandi Parishad & Ors. v. Sanjiv Rajan, [1993) Suppl. 3 S.C.C. 483, E 
referred to. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 911-llA-
12 of 1994. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.3.93 & 30.9.93 of the Orissa F 
Administrative Tribunal at Cuttack in M.P. Nos. 701193 in O.A. Nos. 3%/93 
& M.P. No. 2492/93 in 0.A. No. 1594 of 1993. 
dent. 
G.L. Sanghi and R.K. Mehta for the Appellant. 
G 
R.K. Garg, P.H. Parekh and N.K. Sahoo Advocate for the Respon-
The Judgment of

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