STATE OF NAGALAND versus LIPOK AO AND ORS.

Citation: [2005] 3 S.C.R. 108 · Decided: 01-04-2005 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 5 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
STATE OF NAGALAND 
v. 
LIPOK AO AND ORS. 
t-
} 
APRIL I, 2005 
B 
[ARIJIT PASAYAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] 
~
Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Application filed by Appellant-State 
in terms of S.378, CrPC seeking leave to appeal before High Court against 
c acquittal of accused-respondents by Trial Court-Delay of 57 days in filing 
the app/ication-Condonation of-Held: High Court erred in rejecting the 
application for condonation of delay-"Sufficient cause" for condonation of 
delay should be considered with pragmatism-Factors peculiar to functioning 
of the State such as procedural red-tape cannot be excluded from 
consideration-8tate being an impersonal machinery cannot be put on the 
c same footing as an individual who would alw<rys be quick in taking decision-
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 378(3). 
A case under 302/3071326/34 IPC was registered against the 
respondents, but the Trial O~urt acquitted them. Against the acquittal, 
E 
the State Government in terms of Section 378(3) CrPC filed application 
l 
for grant of.leave to appeal before the High Court. Since there was delay 
of 57 days in making the application, an application for condonation of 
delay was also filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. High 
Court, however, refused to condone the delay on grounds that it was the 
duty of the litigant to file appeal before expiry of the limitation period; 
F that merely because the Additional Advocate General did not file an appeal 
inspite of the instructions issued to him, that did not constitute sufficient 
cause and further the fact that the records were purportedly missing was 
not a valid ground. Accordingly the application for condonation of delay 
and consequentially the application for grant of leave to appeal was · 
rejected. Hence the present appeal. 
G 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
---
HELD : 1.1. The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent 
for exercise of the extraordinary restriction vested in the court. What 
counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and 
H 
108 
) -
ST ATE OF NAGALAND v. LI POK AO 
109 
shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account A 
in using the discretion. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid 
down by hard and fast rules. (113-A-DI 
N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, AIR (1998) SC 3222 and State 
of Kera/a v. E.K. Kuriyipe, (198'1) Supp SCC 72, relied on. 
New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra, (1975) 2 SCC 840; Brij 
Jndar Singh v. Karishi Ram, ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 (PC); Shakuntala Devi 
Jain v. Kunta/ Kumari, AIR (1969) SC 575; Concord of India Insurance Co. 
B 
Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi, (1979] 4 SCC 365; Lala Matu Din v. A. Narayanan, 
(19691 2 SCC 770; Mi/avi Devi v. Dina Nath, (1982] 3 SCC 366 and OP. C 
Kathpa/ia v. Lakhmir Singh, [1984) 4 SCC 66, referred to. 
1.2. The expression "sufficient cause" should be considered with 
pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical 
detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. (116-E) 
2.1. Considerable delay of procedural re-tape in the process of D 
decision making by the Government is a common feature. Therefore, 
certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by 
the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but 
what in the ultimate analysis suffers; is public interest. The court should 
decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. E 
[116-D-F) 
2.2. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State 
vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient 
cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells 
to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision F 
by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorize 
the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for 
settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, needed prompt action 
should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he 
should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State G 
cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would 
always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the 
remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally 
injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its 
officers or servants.

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