LexSTATE OF N.C.T. OF DELHI AND ANR. versus SANJEEV @ BITTOO
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STATE OF N.C.T. OF DELHI AND ANR. A v. SANJEEV @ BITTOO APRIL 4, 2005 [ARIJIT PASA Y AT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] B Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226-Delhi Police Act, 1978- Sections 47, 51and52-Administrative decision-Judicial interference-Scope of-Held: Courts should be slow to interfere in matters relating to C administrative functions unless decision is tainted by illegality, irrationality . and procedural propriety-Section 52 though limits the scope of consideration by the Courts, the scope of judicial review in writ petition is not restricted Respondent-Police Officer passed an order under Section 47 of Delhi Police Act, 1978 directing externment of the respondent from the limits D of NCT Delhi for a certain period. The order was challenged u/s.51 of the Act which was rejected by the Lieutenant Governor. Writ Petition was also dismissed by High Court holding that pre-requisites for passing an order u/s.47 of the Act were not available; and that there was no clear material or elaborate reasoning indicated to show that alternative options were examined and only one of them was adopted. E Jn appeal to this Court, appellant contended that it was not necessary to pass detailed order while exercising powers under the Act to direct externment; that the question of period of externment could not be questioned in a Writ Petition; that respondent-Police Officer not only F enumerated the various acts with reference to materials but also came t~ hold that immediate action in terms of Section 47 was necessary and all relevant details were given; and that the fact that one of the options was adopted after analyzing factual scenario clearly indicated that the other two options were not considered sufficient enough to deal with the particular situation. G Disposing of the appeal, the Court HELD : 1.1. Administrative action is referable to broad area of Governmental activities in which the repositories of power may exercise 151 H 152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 3 S.C.R. A every class of statutory function of executive, quasi-legislative and quasi- judicial nature. It is trite law that exercise of power, whether legislative or administrative, will be set aside if there is manifest error in the exercise of such power or the exercise of the power is manifestly arbitrary. State of 0.P. and Ors. v. Renusagar Power Co. and Ors., AIR (1988) B SC 1737, referred to. "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" by De Smith, 4th Edition pages 285-287, referred to. 1.2. The authority in which discretion is vested can be compelled to C exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it; it must not act under the dictates of another body or disable itself from exercising discretion in each individual case. In the purported D exercise of its discretion, it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorized to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, must not see~ to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. T'1ese several principles · E can be grouped in two main categories: (i) failure to exercise a discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and whi:re an authOrity hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. F (161-B-EJ . 1.3. The grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified into three heads. The first ground is 'illegality' the second 'irrationality', and the third 'procedural impropriety'. If the power has been exercised on a non-consideration or G non-application of mind to relevant factors, the exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous. If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated. . (161-F-H; 162-AJ H Commissioner of Income-tax v. Mahindra and M
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