STATE OF MAHARASHTRA versus MAYER HANS GEORGE
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A • B c D E F G H STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v . MAYER HANS GEORGE August 24, 1964 (K. SuBBA RAo, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYA"NGAR AND J. R. MuDHOLKAR JJ.) Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (1 of 1947), ss. 8(1) 23(1-A) and 24(1)-Mens rea-When a necessary ingredient of offence-Publication of notlfication-'-Knowledge of notification-When can h~ imputed-"Cargo" a1td "persona/ Luggage", meaning of. The respondent, a German smuggler, left Zurich by plane on 27th Nov- ember 1962 with 34 kilos of gold concealed on his person to be delivered in Manila. The plane arrived in Bombay on the 28th but the respondent did not come out of the plane. The Customs Authorities examined the manifest of the aircraft to see if any gold was consigned by any passenger. a11d not finding any entry they entered the plane, searched the respondent. recovered the gold and charged him with an offence under ss. 8 ( 1) and 23(1-A) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (7 of 1947) read with a notification dated 8th November 1962 of the Reserve Bank of India which was published in the Gazette of India on 24th November. The res- pondent was convicted by the Magistrate, but acquitted by the High Court on appeal. In the appeal by the State to the Supreme Court, the respon- dent sought to support the judgment of the High Court by contending that : (i) Mens rea was an essential ingredient of the offence charged and as it was not disputed by the prosecution that the respondent was not aware of the notification of the Reserve Bank, he could not be found guilty, (ii) the notification being merely subordinate or delegated legislation could be deemed to be in force only when it was brought to the notice of persons affected by it and (iii) the second proviso in the notification requiring dis- closure in the manifest was not applicable to gold carried on the person of a passenger. HELD: (per RA.rAGOPALA AYYANGAR and MunHoLKAR JJ.) (i) On the language of s. 8(1) read with s. 24(1) of the Act, which throws on the accused the burden of proving that he had the requisite permission to bring gold into India, there was no scope for the invocation of the rule that besides the mere act of voluntarily bringing gold into India any further mental condition or mens rea is postulated as necessary to constitute an offence referred to ins. 23(1-A). Further, the very object and purpose of the Act and its effectiveness as an instrument for the prevention of &muggling would be entirely frustrated if a condition were to be read into the sections qualifying the plains words of the enactment, that the accused •hould be proved to have knowledge that he was contravening the law beioce be could be held to have contravened the provision. (145G; 147G; 154C-D; 1570-E]. Case law reviewed. The Jndo-Chlna St•am Navigation Co. Ltd. v. lasjit Singh, Addi. Col- l•clor of Customs, Calcutta (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1140) .followed. (ii) The notification was "published" and made known in India by publi· cation in the Gazette and the ignorance of it by the respondent who is a foreigner was wholly irrelevant and made no difference to his liability. [163B-D]. IH SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1965] I S.C.IL In the absence of any statutory requirement the rule is that subordinate or delegated legislation should be published in the usual form, that is, by publication within the country by such media as are generally adopted to notify to all persons concerned and .publication in the Official Gazette is the ordinary method of hringing a notification or rule to the notice of persons concerned. [164A-BJ. Um Chi11 A ik v. The Queen [ 1963] A.C. 160, Distingut•hed. John.mn v. Sargant & Sons [1918] I K.B. 101 and lmperator v. Leslie Gwilt I.LR. [1945} Rom. 681, referred to. An enactment on the lines of the U.K. Statutory Instruments Act, 1946 or suitable amendment of General Clauses Act (IO of I897) to clarify when subordinate legislation could he said to have been passed and when it comes into effect. suggested. [164E-FJ. . (iii) The term "cargo" in the notification is u~cd in contradistinction to "'per.>e>nal luggage" in the Jaw relating to the carriage of goods. The latter bas been defined as whatever a passenger takes with him for bis penooal use or convenience either with reference to his immediate necessities or for his personal needs at the end of the journey. Gold of the quantity and in the fonn and manner in which it was carried by the respondent would
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