STATE OF MAHARASHTRA versus JUGAMANDER LAL
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B โขยท D โข E F T โข G H STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. JUGAMANDER LAL December 9, 1965 (A. K. SARKAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.] Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, <. 3(1)-Whether first offence must be punished with imprisonment and fine-"Punishable" as distinguished from "Punished"-Whether gives dis- cretion to court not to impose imprisonment. The respondent was convicted of offences under sections 3 ( 1) and 4(1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956. For the offence under s. 3(1) he was sentenced by the trial court to pay a fine of Rs. 1,500 and for that under s. 4(1) to pay a fine of Rs. 500. On appeal by the respondent, the High Court affirmed his con- viction. The State preferred an application before the High Court for enhancement of the sentences and with regard to the offence under s. 3(1) it was contended on behalf of the State that it was obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to pass the minimum sentence of imprison~ ment against the respondent. The High Court enhanced the fine in respect of this offence to a sum of Rs. 2,000/ - but did not pass a sentence of imprisonment. In reaching this conclusion, the High Court took the view that the use of the word "punishable" in s. 3 (1) instead of the word "punished" necessarily postulates a certain discretion on the court to impose a sentence of imprisonment or a sentence of fine or both. On appeal to this Court- HELD : In the context in which the word "punishable" has been used in s. 3 ( 1) it is impossible to construe it as giving any discretion to the court in the matter of determining the nature of sentences to be passed in respect of a contravention of the provision. The punishments for a first offence under s. 3 ( !) are rigorous imprisonment for a period not less than one year and not more than three years and also a fine which may extend to Rs. 2,000/ -. [5 E-0) The expression "punishablen means "liable to punishment", which only means that a person who has contravened a penal provision will have to be punished. It does not mean anything different from "shall be punished". Punishment is obligatory in either cases but what the nature of punishment is to be, must be ascertained by a consideration of the whole of the penal provision. [4 HJ CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 114 of 1965. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 11th/ 12th November, 1963 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 161 of 1963 with Criminal Revision No. 917 of 1963. N. S. Bindra and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant. R. K. Garg and U. P. Singh, for the respondent. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1966] 3 S.CR. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A Mudholkar, J. In this appeal by special leave from a judg- ment of the High Court of Bombay the short point for considera- tion is whether it is obligatory upon the court which convicts a person of an offence under s. 3 ( 1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 to pass a sentence of B imprisonment where the conviction is, in respect of a first offence, for a term not less than one year and not merely to a sentence of fine. The Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, held the respondent guilty of an ofTence under s. 3 (I) of the Act for keeping a brothel or allowing the premises in his occupation to be used as a brothel and passed a sentence of fine of Rs. 1,500/- but did not pass a c ,entence of imprisonment. The respondent was also found guilty of an offence under s. 4 (I ) of the Act for living on the earning of prostitution and sentenced by him to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-. The respondent challenged his conviction in ~espect of each of the two offences as well as the sentences awarded to him. The High Court affirmed his conviction for these offences. The State pre- D fcrred an application for revision before the High Court for en- hancement of the sentences which was heard along with the appeal. It was contended on behalf of the State that it was obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to pass the minimum sentence of impri- sonment against the respondent in respect of the offence as pro- vided under s. 3 (I) of the Act. It was also contended that though there was no obligation on the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment in respect of the offence under s. 4( I) of the Act, the sentence awarded by him was inadequate.
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