STATE OF MAHARASHTRA versus CHAMPALAL PUNJAJI SHAH

Citation: [1982] 1 S.C.R. 299 · Decided: 12-08-1981 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: O. CHINNAPPA REDDY · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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299 
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 
v. 
CHAMPALAL PUNJAJI SHAH 
August 12, 1981 
(0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.J 
Customs Act, section 135-Gold bars with foreign markings discovered in the 
house of accused-Trial delayed for many years by action of accused-Delay-
Whether a mitigating circumstance in according sentence. 
Delayed trial-Whether violative of fundamental right under Article 21 of 
Constitution-Principles to be taken into consideration in considering delayed trials. 
Under the present system of criminal justice an accused person resolutely 
minded to delay the day of reckoning, may quite conveniently and comfortably 
do so, if he can but afford the cost involved, by journ~ying back and forth 
between the court of first instance and the superior Courts at frequent interlocu· 
tory stages, by filing applications to quash investigations, complaints and charges 
on all imaginable grounds. Delay is a known defence tactic. 
All this is not to say that the responsibility for delaying criminal trials 
should always be laid at the door of the rich and the reluctant accused. Delays 
caused by tardiness, indifference and somnolence or the deliberate inactivity of 
prosecuting agencies are not uncommon or unknown. As a result of the delaying 
tactics of prosecuting agencies an accused person may be seriously jeopardised 
in the conduct of his defence. In such a situation it may be possible to infer 
infringement of the right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the 
Constitution. Denial of a speedy trial may lead to an inference of prejudice 
and denial of justice. 
Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, [1979] 3 SCR 169, referred to. 
In deciding whether there has been denial of the right to speedy trial the 
court is entitled to take into consideration whether the defendant himself 
1was 
responsible for a part of the delay. whether he was prejudiced in the pre-
~arati~n of his defence by reason of the delay and whether the delay was un-
1ntent1onally caused by reason of overcrowding of the Court's docket or under. 
~taffing of prosecutors and so forth. Though in India the right of speedy trial 
1s .not ~n ex~res~ly guaranteed c?nstitutional right it is implicit in the right to 
fau tnal which ts a part of the right to life and liberty guaranteed b A 1· I 21 
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Ile a speedy trial is an implied ingredient of a fair trial 
the converse is not necessarily true. A delayed trial is not 
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fair trial. 
necessan y an un~ 
. 
The question whether conviction should be quashed on grounds of de1 
ed 
tnal depends upon the facts and circumstances of a case 
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300 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[I 982] I s:c.R. 
satisfaction of the Court that the accused had been prejudiced in the conduct of 
his defence and thus had been denied adequate opportunity to defend himself 
the conviccion would have to be set aside. There would, on the contrary, be no 
justification to quash a conviction on the ground of delayed trial unless it is 
shown that there are circumstances entitling the court to raise a presumption 
that the accused had b~en prejudiced. 
[304 B-C] 
In the instant case in a 
surprise raid on the house of the respondent, 
Central Excise officers discovered a large quantity of gold bars with foreign 
markings conceal~d in 
th~ false batto:n of a steel almirah, the keys of which 
were found with him. 
On a charge for offences under section 120B I.P.C. read with section 135 
Castoms Act and rule 126P(2)(ii) and (iv) of the Defence of India Rules 1962, 
the Additional Chief Presideacy Magistrate convicted the respondent and vari-
ously sentenced him und.;:r different counts with imprisonment and fine. 
On 
appeal the High Court acquitted him. 
HELD : Although it is settled law that circumstantial evidence must be 
of a conclusive nature and circumstances n1ust not be · capable of a duality of 
explanations, the Court is not bound to accept any exaggerated, capricious or 
ridiculous explanation which may suggest itself to a highly imaginative mind. 
The three circumst1nces established in the instant case were: (l) presence of the 
respondent in the flat at the time of the raid by Central Excise Officers and 
recovery of gold slabs with foreign markings from the steel almirah: (2) recovery 
from his person of a bun;;h of eight keys which fitted the almirah and (3) recovery 
ofa 

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