STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH versus SALEEM@ CHAMARU AND ANR.

Citation: [2005] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 562 · Decided: 13-07-2005 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Disposed off
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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
STA TE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
v. 
SALEEM@ CHAMARU AND ANR. 
JULY 13, 2005 
B 
[ARIJIT PASA Y AT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860: 
ss. 307 and 333 and 307134 and 333134-Accused attacking a police 
C constable on duty-Causing knife injuries on his neck-Convicted and 
sentenced by trial court to R.J. for 5 years-High Court reducing sentence 
to the period already undergone being about seven months only-Held, 
offences alleged are of very serious nature and conviction was not challenged 
before High Court-It is duty of every court to award proper sentence having 
D regard to nature of offence and the manner in which it was committed-
Matter remitted to High Court to hear the matter only relating to sentence-
Sentencing. 
Accused-respondents were prosecuted, inter a/ia, u/ss. 307 and 333 IPC 
for assaulting the complainant, a police constable, on his neck with sharp 
E edged weapon with intention to kill him' and for deterring him from performing 
his public duty by voluntarily causing grievous hurt with a sharp edged weapon. 
The trial court convicted accused-respondent No.2 under ss. 307 and 333 and 
accused-respondent No. 2 under ss. 307/34 and 333/34 and sentenced each 
of them for 5 years R.I. on the first count and 4 years R.I. on the second count 
F as also with fine. On appeal, the High Court reduced the sentence to the 
custodial period which was nearly seven months, observing that the accused 
were illiterate persons belonging to lower income .group and were of 23 years 
of age at the time of commission of offence. 
In the present appeal filed by the State, it was contended that the offences 
G were of quite serious nature and the High Court should not have shown 
undeserved sympathy. 
H 
Disposing of the appeal and remitting the matter to the High Court, the 
Court 
562 
STATEOFM.P. v. SALEEM@CHAMARU 
563 
HELD: 1. In the instant case, it is to be noted that the alleged offences A 
are of very serious nature and conviction was not challenged before the High 
<:::ourt. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm 
to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of 
law and society could not long endure under such serious threats. The 
punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should B 
conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the 
crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public 
abhorrence and it should "respond to the society's cry for justice against the 
criminal". [565-H; 566-H] 
Sevaka Perumal etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR (1991) SC 1463, relied C 
on. 
Dennis Councle MCGDautha v. State of Callifornia, 402 US 183: 28 
L.D. 2d 711, referred to. 
2.1. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. D 
It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act 
in execution thereof. Section 307 IPC makes a distinction between the act of 
the accused and its result, if any. To justify a conviction under s.307, it is not 
essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted; 
it is sufficient if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in 
execution thereof. Therefore, an accused charged under s.307 IPC cannot be E 
acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature 
ofa simple hurt. [567-F, G, H; 568-A) 
State of Maharasthra v. Bairam Barna Patil and Ors., [1983) 2 SCR 28; 
Girija Shankar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [2004) 3 SCC 793 and R. Parkash 
v. State of Karnataka, JT (2004) 2 SC 348, relied on. 
F 
Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR (1965) SC 84, relied on. 
2.2. Section 307 deals with two situations so far as the sentence is 
concerned. Firstly, whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, 
and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would G 
be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description 
for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and 
secondly if hurt is caused to any person by such act the offender shall be 
liable either to imprisonment for life or to such punishment as indicated in 
the first part i.e. 10 years'. The maximum punishment pr~\'ided for Section H 
564 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 
A 333 is imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 
years with a liability to pay fine. The maximum sentence in each ca
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