STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH versus KEDAR YADAV
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A B STA TE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. KEDARYADAV NOVEMBER 30, 2006 [ARIJIT PASA YAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860-Section 307-Attempt to murder-Essential ingredients of -Stated-On facts, nature of injuries sustained, weapon used C and opinion of doctors that the injuries were enough to cause death-Thus, conviction of accused under section 307 by trial court justified-However, reduction of sentence of ten years rigorous imprisonment to period already undergone by High Court in view of relevant aspects of the matter as well as long passage of time not justified-Sentence/Sentencing. D Sentence/Sentencing: Imposition of-Duty of court to award proper sentence-Undue sympathy in favour of accused, effect of-Object of law behind imposition of appropriate sentence-Just and appropriate punishment, criteria for determination-Stated E Trial court convicted the respondent under section 307 IPC and F G H imposed sentence of ten years rigorous imprisonment and fine. The Single Judge of High Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to the period already undergone. Hence the prese,nt appeal. Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The nature of the injuries sustained, the weapon used and the opinion of the doctors to the effect that the injuries were enough to cause death, the trial court had rightly convicted the accused-respondent for offence punishable under Section 307 IPC. (859-C) Kundan Singh v State of Punjab (19821 3 SCC 213, distinguished. 1.2. High Court was not justified in reducing the sentence to the period already undergone. Taking into account all relevant aspects including long passage of time which per se is not a ground for reduction 852 • . ' • STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. KEDAR YADAV 853 in sentence, order of the High Court, so far as it relates to the reduction of A period of sentence, is set aside. Respondent would undergo custodial sentence for three years subject to such remissions as may be available in law and would pay a fine ofRs.10,000/-. (859-D-E) Sevaka Perumal etc. v. State of Tamil Naidu AIR (1991) SC 1463, relied on. Dennis Councle MCGDautha v. State of Callifornia: 402 US 183: 28 L.D. 2d 711 - referred to. B 2.1. To justify a conviction under section 307 IPC, it is not essential C that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The Section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its D res11Jt, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this Section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What E the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. [857-G-H; 858-A-C) F 2.2. Whether there was intention to kill or knowledge that death will be caused is a question of fact and would depend on the facts of a given case. The circumstances that the injury inflicted by the accused was simple or minor will not by itself rule out application of Section 307 IPC. The determinative question is intention or knowledge, as the case may be, and not nature of the injury. [858-G-H) G 2.3. Section 307 deals with two situations so far as the sentence is concerned. Firstly, whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either H 854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R. A description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be. liable to fine; and secondly if hurt is caused to any person by such ad the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life or to such punishment as indicated i
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