STATE OF M.P. versus DESHRAJ AND ORS.

Citation: [2004] 1 S.C.R. 1185 · Decided: 29-01-2004 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: DORAISWAMY RAJU · Disposal: Dismissed
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Judgment (excerpt)

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STATE OF M.P. 
A 
v. 
DESHRAJ AND ORS. 
JANUARY 29, 2004 
[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASA YAT, JJ.] 
B 
Penal Code, 1860: 
Ss.302134, 323134 and 304 Part fl-Prosecution u/s 302134 for murder C 
of one and injuries to others-Injuries caused in course of sudden quarrel-
Trial Court convicted 10 accused uls 323134 holding offence uls 302134 not 
made out in absence of evidence showing as to which injury was atlributable 
lo which accused-One of the accused acquitled-Judgment of Trial Court 
upheld by High Coiirt-On appeal, held: Conviction uls 323 not justified-
However, in view of the fact that injuries caused in course of sudden quarrel D 
accused convicted uls 304 Part 11-Acqui/la/ of one of the accused is justified. 
Section 34-Na/Ure and applicability of-Held: It is only a rule of 
evidence and does not create a substantive offence-Proof of common intention 
can only be inferred fi'om circumstances appearing fi'om proved facts-For 
applying the provision it fr not necessmy to show some overt act. 
E 
Eleven accused-appellants faced trial u/s 302 r/w Section 34 IPC for 
having caused death of one person and having injured PWs 5, 9 and I 0. 
Trial Court acquitted ae,:cused No. II finding no material against him. As 
regards accused Nos. I to 10, it held that their case was not covered u/s F 
302/34 IPC in absence of any documentary evidence to show as to which 
injury could be attributed to which accused. But in view of several other 
injuries on the deceased, it held that case u/s 323/34 IPC was made out. 
High Court confirmed the judgment of trial court. 
In appeal to this Court appellant-State contended that the courts G 
below had lost sight of true import of Section 34 IPC. 
Respondents-accused contended that in view of the fact that the 
occurrence took place in course of a quarrel and in absence of material 
to show as to who caused which injury, judgments of Courts below should 
1185 
H 
1186 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2004] I S.C.R. 
A not be varied. 
Disposing of the appeal, the Court 
!-fELD: I. Trial Court and the High Court were not justified in 
holding that offence committed was under Section 323 read with Section 
B 34 IPC. Applying the factual scenario noticed by the Trial Court and the 
High Court more particularly the fact that there was fight between accused 
and the deceased and the injured witnesses, and the injuries came to be 
innicted in course of sudden quarrel, it would be appropriate to convict 
respondents 2 to 10 under Section 304 Part 11 IPC. Trial Court has rightly 
C observed that there was practically no material to find respondent No. I I 
guilty. 11190-D, F-GJ 
2.1. Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in 
the doing of a criminal act. The Section is only a rule of evidence and do1~s 
not create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the Section is 
D the element of participation in action. The liability of one person for an 
offence committed by another in the course or criminal act perpetrated 
by several persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in 
furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in committing 
the crime. Direct proof of common intention is seldom available and, 
E therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances 
appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. 
In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution 
has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there 
was plan or meeting of m.ind of all the accused persons to commit the 
offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be it pre-
f 
arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must necessarily be before the 
commission of the crime. The true contents of the Section is that if two or 
more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the 
same as if each of them has done it individually by himself. The existence 
of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential 
G element for application of this Section. It is not necessary that the acts of 
the several persons charged with commission or an offence jointly must 
be the same or identically similar. The acts may be different in character, 
but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention in 
order to attract the provision. 11189-D-H; 1190-AI 
H 
As/10k Kumar v. State of Punjab. AIR (1977) SC 109, relied on. 
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ST
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