STATE OF M.P. versus BADRI Y ADAV AND ANR.
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
STATEOFM.P. A 11. BADRI Y ADAV AND ANR. MARCH 31, 2006 [H.K. SEMA AND DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, JJ.) B Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.233-Examination of witness for defence-Prosecution witnesses- C Supporting prosecution case in their statements u/s 164 as also before trial court deposing as eye-witnesses-Later filing affidavit before trial court resiting from their earlier statements and deposing as defence witnesses- Held, this was clearly for the purpose of defeating the ends of justice which is not permissible under the /aw-Provisions of sub-s.(3) of s.233 cannot be understood as compelling attendance of any prosecution witness examined, D cross-examined and discharged to be juxtaposed as DWs-High Court was not justified in reversing conviction recorded by trial court-Penal Code, 1860-s.302134. Penal Code, 1860: s.193--Perjury-Prosecution witnesses-Resiting from their earlier statements made u/s 164 Cr.P.C. and statements as eye-witnesses made on oath before Court of Session-Later filing affidavit before trial court appearing as defence witnesses and resiling from their earlier statements and denying E to have seen the incident at all-Held, their subsequent statements made as F DWs, prima facie, appear to be false-Trial court is directed to file a complaint uls 193 and initiate proceeding against the PWs juxtaposed as DWs-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-s.233(3). Appellant alongwith others was prosecuted under s.302/34 IPC. Prosecution witnesses, PW 8 and PW 9 supported the prosecution case as eye- G witnesses in their statements recorded u/s 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate on 21.9.1989 and during the trial before the Court of Session on 18.12.1990. Later, these two witnesses filed affidavits on 16.8.1994 before the trial court stating that their earlier statements made before the Magistrate and the trial court were 623 H 624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006 I 3 S.C.R. A tutored by the police and were made due to threat and coercion. They denied to have seen any incident at all. The trial court allowed them to be examined as defence witnesses. They deposed as DW-1 and DW-2 and resiled from their earlier statements. The trial court observed that in between 18.12.1990, the day on which their statements were recorded as PWs and 17.7.1995, when their B statements were recorded as defence witnesses, no complaint whatsoever was made by them that they gave the earlier statements due to coercion, threat or being tutored by the police; and disbelieved their subsequent statements made as defence witnesses. The trial court after considering the evidence of prosecution witnesses including the evidence of the two eye witnesses as PW-8 and PW-9, convicted the accused under s.302 read with s.34 IPC. On appeal, the High Court C acquitted the accused observing that delay in conducting the trial resulted in strange situation where the two witnesses stated ~omething as prosecution witnesses and after lapse of sufficienc time gave evidence as defence witnesses. Aggrieved, the State filed the appeal. D E F Allowing the appeal, the Com1 HELD: I.I. The power to summon any person as a witness or recall and re-examine any person already examined is the discretionary power of the Court in case such evidence appears to it to be essential for a just decision of the case. Under Section 233 Cr.P.C. the accused can enter upon defence and he can apply for the issue of any process for compelling the attendance of any witness in his defence. The provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 233 cannot be understood as compelling the attendance of any prosecution witness examined, cross- examined and discharged to be juxtaposed as DWs. In the present case PW-8 and PW-9 were juxtaposed as DW-1 and DW-2. This situation is not one what was contemplated by sub-section (3) ofSection 233 Cr.P.C.1629-C, DI 1.2. When such frivolous and vexatious petitions are filed, a Judge is not powerless. He should use his discretionary power and refuse relief on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice. In the instant case, the witnesses were examined by the prosecution as eyewitnesses on 18.12.1990, cross-examined and discharged. Thereafter, an G application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for recalling and re-examining persons already examined was rejected. The two witnesses were recalled purportedly in exercise of power under sub-section (3) of Se
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex