STATE OF KERALA versus RASHEED
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A B C D E F G H 587 STATE OF KERALA v. RASHEED (Criminal Appeal No.1321 of 2018) OCTOBER 30, 2018 [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.231(2) – Application by accused seeking adjournment under – Prosecution alleged that accused persons had detained victim, tortured him and then killed him with criminal intention – Charges were framed by the trial Court and prosecution witnesses were summoned – After examination-in- chief of CW-1, an application was filed by the Respondent-accused no.2 seeking adjournment of the cross-examination of CW-1, and also of CWs 2 to 5, to a date after the examination-in-chief of CWs 2 to 5 was complete – Application was dismissed by the Trial Court with the observation that no specific reason for deferring the cross-examination was given by the respondent-accused no.2 – Propriety of – Held: Proper – s.231(2) of the Cr.P.C. confers a discretion on the Judge to defer the cross-examination of any witness until any other witness or witnesses have been examined, or recall any witness for further cross-examination, in appropriate cases – Judicial discretion has to be exercised in consonance with the statutory framework and context while being aware of reasonably foreseeable consequences – The party seeking deferral u/s.231(2) of the Cr.P.C. must give sufficient reasons to invoke the exercise of discretion by the Judge, and deferral cannot be asserted as a matter of right – Further, while deciding an application u/s.231(2) of the Cr.P.C., a balance must be struck between the rights of the accused, and the prerogative of the prosecution to lead evidence – The factors like possibility of undue influence on witness(es); possibility of threats to witness(es) etc. must be kept in consideration – In instant case, there was a possibility of undue influence and intimidation of witness(es) since the respondent- accused No.2 and accused No.7 were highly influential political leaders – Thus, trial Court was right in dismissing the application u/s.231(2) of the Cr.P.C. – Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.135 and 138. [2018] 13 S.C.R. 587 587 A B C D E F G H 588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 13 S.C.R. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: The norm in any criminal trial is for the examination- in-chief of witnesses to be carried out first, followed by cross- examination, and re-examination if required, in accordance with Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 231(2) of the Cr.P.C., however, confers a discretion on the Judge to defer the cross-examination of any witness until any other witness or witnesses have been examined, or recall any witness for further cross-examination, in appropriate cases. Judicial discretion has to be exercised in consonance with the statutory framework and context while being aware of reasonably foreseeable consequences. The party seeking deferral under Section 231(2) of the Cr.P.C. must give sufficient reasons to invoke the exercise of discretion by the Judge, and deferral cannot be asserted as a matter of right. [Para 7] [596-A-C] 2. There cannot be a straitjacket formula providing for the grounds on which judicial discretion under Section 231(2) of the Cr.P.C. can be exercised. The exercise of discretion has to take place on a case-to-case basis. The guiding principle for a Judge under Section 231(2) of the Cr.P.C. is to ascertain whether prejudice would be caused to the party seeking deferral, if the application is dismissed. [Para 10] [599-F-G] 3. While deciding an Application under Section 231(2) of the Cr.P.C., a balance must be struck between the rights of the accused, and the prerogative of the prosecution to lead evidence. The following factors must be kept in consideration: possibility of undue influence on witness(es); possibility of threats to witness(es); possibility that non-deferral would enable subsequent witnesses giving evidence on similar facts to tailor their testimony to circumvent the defence strategy; possibility of loss of memory of the witness(es) whose examination-in-chief has been completed; occurrence of delay in the trial, and the non-availability of witnesses, if deferral is allowed, in view of Section 309(1) of the Cr.P.C. These factors are illustrative for guiding the exercise of discretion by a Judge under Section 231(2) of the Cr.P.C. [Para 11] [599-G-H; 600-A-C] A B C D E F G H 589 4. The following practice guidelines should be followed by trial courts in the conduct of a criminal trial, as far as
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