STATE OF KERALA AND ANR. versus P.V. NEELAKANDAN NAIR AND ORS.
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A B -C ST ATE OF KERALA AND ANR. v. P.V. NEELAKANDAN NAIR AND ORS. JULY II, 2005 [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] Service Law: Kera/a Education Rules, 1959-Chapter XIV(A) Rule 62-Kerala Service Rules-Rule 60(c)-Pay Revision-Benefit of-Entitlement of-To teachers continuing in service after superannuation by virtue of Rule 62- Held: Such teachers are entitled to the benefit of revision-Rule 60(c) denies benefit of incre1J1ent and promotion which is conceptually different from revision-Revision cannot be read into the provision uls. 60(c)-Court cannot D read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous- A casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the statute itself-Interpretation of Statutes. Interpretation of Statutes-Object of-Held: ls to ascertain the intention E of the legislature enacting it. Maxim: "Ad ca quae fi·equentius accidund Jura adaplantur"-Meaning of p Words and Phrases: 'increment' and 'revision '-Meaning of in the context of Service Law. The questions for consideration in this case was whether teachers superannuating during a particular academic year but continuing in service G by virtue of Rule 62 of Chapter XIV(A) ofKerala Education Rules, 1959 are entitled to the benefit of pay revision coming into effect during such extended period. Dismissing the appeals, the Court H 426 STATEOFKERALAv. P.V.NEELAKANDANNAIR 427 HELD: 1. A civil servant retires under the applicable rules in the A afterno-0n of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 55 years. Similarly a teacher is normally to retire on completing the age of 55 years. But in the specifically prescribed cases the date of retirement is postponed "till the last day of month in which the academic year ends" so that the education of the students is not disturbed during the academic year. The legislature has denied the benefit of increment and promotion during the B extended period. There is no scope for reading into the provision the benefits of pay revision. "Increment" has a definite concept in service laws. It is conceptually different from revision of pay scale. "Increment" is an increase or addition on a fixed scale; it is a regular increase in salary on such a scale. Under the Labour and Industrial Laws, an "increment" is in the same scale. C A promotion involves going to a higher grade. The pay of an employee is generally fixed with reference to a pay scale. On the other hand, in the case of revision, the pay scale is revised which may incidentally result into increment. Rule 60(c) does not refer to pay revisions which is conceptually different from annual increments within the prescribed pay scale. Therefore, entitlement of the concerned teachers for the benefits of pay revision cannot be doµbted. (435-G, H; 436-A-B-C) State Bank of India v. The Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour Court, Dhanbad and Anr., (1972] 3 SCC 595, relied on. 2.1. The expression "increment" cannot be read as "the enhanced, amount received or receivable due to pay revision". The Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute D E is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute F is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as G meaningless has to be avoided. Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act. It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners H 428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. l S.C.R. A of the Act itself. (432-E, F, G; 433-A-C] Institute of Chartered Account
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