LexSTATE OF KARNATKA versus KRISHNAJI SRINIVAS KULKARNI AND ORS.
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--..:· ,., .,. STA.'f.E OF KARNATAKA A v .. KRISHNAJI SRINIV AS KULKARNI AND ORS. DECEMBER 16, 1993 [K. RAMASWAMY AND G.N. RAY;JJ.] B Kamataka Land Reforms Act, 196J.,--Section 79-B-Prohibition that Company could not hold aglicultural lan~Such land to vest in Govern- ment-Even after expiry of /e,zse, .land possessed by Company-It filed the requil!ed <teclaration-/.,and wsting in Government-Validity of-Quoting a C wrong provision in the dec/ara ion----Wheth.et could take away the jurisdiction .of the authorities,. t The respondents leased their agricult~ral lands br a registered lease dated April 1, 1942 for a peri >d of 30 years which stood expired on March 31, 1973, but tht; lands rem:iined in the p1>ssession of the Company-as D tenant. The Karnataka Land i ,eforms Act, 1961, was a1J1ended b)' AnJend- ment Act 1 of 1974, and it c ime into effect from March 1, 1974. Under sub-section(l)(b) of 79-B of the Act, a Company could not hold any ,g agricultural land. Sub-secti(J n (2) mandated that every such company should furnish to the Tehsildar havingjurisdiction over the land, a decla- rati6n conf.aining the particulars of such lands and such other prescribed particulars. ·· The lessee company submitted a declaration purporting to be under F Section 66 of the Act. The Teh 1ildar after conducting the enquiry and after giving opportunity to the res ~ondents, submitted the declaration to the Deputy Commissioner who p11blished it in the prescribed manner. Thus 600 acres of demised lands i tood vested in the State free from all en- cumbrances. The respondents challe1 iged the action before the High Court con- tending that as on March l 1974, the Company was not holding the demised land as a tenant and he Company was, therefore, incompetent to G fifo any declaration under Se ;lion 66 and it could not be treated to be under Section 79-B that its pl ssession was not lawful and, therefore, the H 971 972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 3 s.c.R.' ... A land dld not stand vest in the State, and that the Company was not a holder under Section 79-B and the land owners were the actual holders· of the lands. The High Court held that the order under challenge was without B authority of law, being outside the purview of Section 79-8(3) of the AcL It did not, however, declare the ownership of the respondents. In t~e appeal before this Court on behalf of the State tt was con• tended that under Section 79·B(1), a person In posses11lon cultivating the land persona11y should alone be entitled to hold the land; the Company c having been declared to be disentltled to hold the lands on or from March 1, 1974 and being enjoined under 8ub-11edton (1) to furnish a declaration to the Tehslldar having Jurisdiction over the land ol' IP'tater part thei'eol, It was the 'holder' for the purpo1e or section '79·B of the Act Which was made clear by sub•sec:tlon (1) thereof. D On behalf of the respondents, lt was contended that the posse•slon of the Company was unlawful as the leaae had expired by emux of time; that 500 acres were taken possession by them1 that though &00 actes remained In the posseHlon of the Company, the Act did not divest their title; that the Company had nelthit right to ftle any Illy declaration under Section 66, nor E under Section 19·B(1) nor was It nted within 90 days' llmltatloit prescribed thereunder, and that since the tenant was bot cultivating the land, nor had Juridical possession, the declaration under Section 79-B(3) was illegal, and • the Interpretation given by thl! Hlgh Court was correcL Allowing the appeal, this Court F HELD : t. Section 79·B prohibits the Compatt)' dr any charitable society or trust ur co-operative society, etc; to hold the lands, Section 2(11) of the Land Revenue Act undoubtedly defines the expressloti 'holder', "to mean In lawful possession of land whether such possessioti is actual or G not". This Court is not so much concerned with the lawful posses!iion or possession of a tenant holding over for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of the Act. Section 6 specifically declares that despite the expiry of lease by emux of time, the tenancy would not stand terminated and that, therefore, the possession of the tenant/company statutorily remains to be Juridical possession. The phrase 'holder' of the land in Section 79·B must H be construed from that perspective. The contra contention violates the ~ 4- f ' ' STATE v. KU
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